HUMAN RIGHTS IN IRAQ

Human rights in post-invasion Iraq

Human rights in post-invasion Iraq have been a subject of concern and controversy since the 2003 U.S. invasion. Issues have been raised regarding the conduct of insurgents, U.S.-led coalition forces, and the Iraqi government. The United States is investigating several allegations of violations of international and domestic standards of conduct in isolated incidents involving its forces and contractors. Similarly, the United Kingdom is conducting investigations into alleged human rights abuses by its forces. War crime tribunals and criminal prosecutions for numerous crimes committed by insurgents are likely still years away. In late February 2009, the U.S. State Department released a report on the human rights situation in Iraq, reflecting on developments during the previous year (2008).[1] Shops in Zakho after the 2011 Dohuk riots

Human rights abuses by insurgents

Main article: Iraq War insurgent attacks See also: List of suicide bombings in Iraq since 2003 and List of massacres of the Iraq War The UN headquarters building in Baghdad after the Canal Hotel bombing, on 22 August 2003 Human rights abuses carried out or alleged to have been carried out by Iraq-based insurgents and/or terrorists include:

August 2003

The bombing of the U.N. headquarters in Baghdad in August 2003 resulted in the death of the top U.N. representative in Iraq, 55-year-old Sérgio Vieira de Mello, a Brazilian diplomat who also served as the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights.[2] The attack claimed the lives of 22 U.N. staff members and injured more than 100 others. Among the dead was Nadia Younes, a former Executive Director at the World Health Organization (WHO) in charge of External Relations and Governing Bodies. The terrorist attack was strongly condemned by U.N.

Secretary-General Kofi Annan and denounced by the U.N. Security Council.[3]

June 2004

South Korean translator Kim Sun-il was beheaded by followers of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.[4]

July 2004

Tawhid and Jihad killed Bulgarian truck drivers Ivaylo Kepov and Georgi Lazov. Al-Jazeera aired a videotape of the incident but stated that the segment showing the actual killings was too graphic to broadcast.[5]

December 2004

Salvatore Santoro, a 52-year-old Italian photographer, was beheaded in a video. The Islamic Movement of Iraqi Mujahedeen claimed responsibility for the act.[4] An Iraqi vehicle burns in Baghdad after being hit by a mortar that was fired by insurgents, 8 August 2006

February 2005

Al-Iraqiya TV (Iraq) aired transcripts of confessions by Syrian intelligence officer Anas Ahmad Al-Issa and Iraqi terrorist Shihab Al-Sab'awi. The confessions detailed their involvement in booby-trap operations, explosions, kidnappings, assassinations, and training for beheadings in Syria.[6]

July 2005

Egyptian and Algerian envoys.

Two Algerian diplomats, Ali Belaroussi and Azzedine Belkadi, were reported to have been killed by al-Qaeda in Iraq. The group issued a statement online claiming responsibility, stating: “The court of al-Qaeda in Iraq has decided to carry out God’s verdict against the two diplomats from the apostate Algerian government ... and ordered to kill them.” The statement was signed by Abu Maysara al-Iraqi, the al-Qaeda spokesman.[7]

An Egyptian diplomat, Al-Sherif, was reported to have been killed by al-Qaeda in Iraq. The group posted a statement on a web forum claiming responsibility for the killing. Top Sunni cleric Mohamed Sayed Tantawi condemned the act, describing it as "a crime against religion, morality, and humanity, as well as a crime that goes against honor and chivalry."[8]

February 2006

The Al Askari Mosque bombing took place on February 22, 2006, at approximately 6:55 am local time (0355 UTC) at the Al Askari Mosque, one of the holiest sites in Shi'a Islam, in the Iraqi city of Samarra, about 100 km (62 mi) northwest of Baghdad. Although no injuries were reported from the blast itself, the bombing led to violence in the following days. On February 23, over 100 dead bodies with bullet holes were found, and at least 165[9] people are believed to have been killed.

June 2006

A video showing the killing of four Russian diplomats kidnapped in Iraq was posted on the Internet. The group called the Mujahideen Shura Council released the hostage video.[10] The Islamic State of Iraq captured and subsequently murdered three U.S. soldiers in May 2007

July 2006

Anba' Al-Iraq News Agency and the Writers Without Borders Organization condemned the imprisonment of its staff member, Husain E. Khadir, who was responsible for covering documentaries about the threats posed by the Kurdistan Federal Region to its neighboring countries. A delegation from Human Rights Watch (HRW) released reports on torture in Iraq, as well as the repression of human rights and freedom of expression. HRW interviewed several detained writers and journalists to document these violations. Mr. Khadir was first detained in Kirkuk and later moved to Erbil, where HRW visited him in one of the detention centers.

The previous year in Baghdad, Khadir faced even worse conditions when he escaped from a Shi'a militia that had seized his house and thrown his family into the streets, an act seen as a serious threat to his life. Such actions are commonly directed at human rights activists, journalists, and writers who criticize the Iraqi government and the Shi'a coalition party. During the constitution-writing process, several press and media agencies strongly criticized the Iraqi Shi'a Coalition. Khadir led a campaign to amend the constitution, advocating for a document that would serve as a peace-building tool, bringing all parties together for national consensus and social cohesion, rather than merely serving as a state-building instrument, as the ruling party frequently stated.

UNAMI commented that most of these civil society activities were supported by UN agencies, international donors, or the U.S. and British governments. The IRIN/UN news agency revealed that journalists and writers are among the most vulnerable victims of killing, threats, kidnapping, torture, and detention, practices commonly carried out by uncontrolled Iraqi forces, paramilitary organizations, and Shi'a or Sunni militias. This situation, similar to Khadir's case, is spreading across southern, central, and northern Iraq.[11] The number of journalists and writers killed in Iraq has exceeded 220 this year, according to the Iraqi Organization for Supporting Journalists, as reported to IRIN.[12] U.S. National Guard Sergeant Frank "Greg" Ford claimed to have witnessed human rights violations in Samarra, Iraq.

However, a subsequent Army investigation found Ford's allegations to be unfounded. Additionally, Ford was discovered to have worn unauthorized "U.S. Navy SEAL" insignia on his Army uniform, despite having never been a Navy SEAL, a claim he had made for many years while serving in the Army National Guard.

The Kuwaiti News Agency reported that a high-ranking Iraqi security source in the Interior Ministry confirmed the final death toll of the 13 August bombings in the Al-Zafaraniyah district in southern Baghdad was 57 killed and 145 injured, most of them women and children.[13] Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki blamed Sunni extremists for seeking to escalate the conflict.[14]

Human rights abuses by coalition forces

Abu Ghraib torture and prisoner abuse Gun camera footage of the airstrike of 12 July 2007 in Baghdad, showing the slaying of Namir Noor-Eldeen and a dozen other civilians by a US helicopter.

Prison and interrogation abuses by coalition forces

Main article: Iraq prison abuse scandal

April 2003

On April 29, 2003, an Iraqi man, Ather Karen al-Mowafakia, was shot and killed by a British soldier at a roadside checkpoint. Witnesses alleged that he was shot in the abdomen after the door of his car struck a soldier's leg as he was getting out of the vehicle. They further claimed he was then dragged from the car and beaten by the soldier's comrades, later succumbing to his injuries in the hospital. Despite seven attempts by The Guardian to address the incident, the UK Ministry of Defence (MOD) has refused to explain why the individuals were detained or provide details on where, how, or why they died.[15]

May 2003

In May 2003, Saeed Shabram and his cousin, Menem Akaili, were detained by British troops and thrown into a river near Basra. Akaili survived, but Shabram drowned. According to Akaili, the two were approached by a British patrol, led at gunpoint to a jetty, and forced into the water. The act, referred to as "wetting," was reportedly used to humiliate local youths suspected of looting. "Wetting was supposed to humiliate those suspected of being petty criminals," said Sapna Malik, the family's lawyer from Leigh Day and Co. "Although the Ministry of Defence (MOD) denies the existence of a policy of wetting to deal with suspected looters at the time, evidence we have seen suggests otherwise. The tactics employed by the MOD appeared to include throwing or placing suspected looters into either of Basra's two main waterways."

Iraqi bystanders rescued Akaili, but Shabram disappeared. His body was later recovered by a diver hired by his father, Radhi Shabram, after a four-hour search while his mother waited on the riverbank. "When Saeed's corpse was finally pulled from the river, Radhi described it as bloated and covered with marks and bruises," Malik added. Although the MOD paid compensation to Shabram's family, none of the soldiers involved were charged in connection with his death.[16] Ahmed Jabbar Kareem Ali, a 15-year-old boy, was on his way to work with his brother on May 8, 2003, when he was assaulted by a group of British soldiers. The soldiers beat him and then forced him into a canal at gunpoint to "teach him a lesson" for suspected looting. Weakened from the beating, Ali struggled in the water and drowned. His lifeless body was later pulled from the canal.

In a separate case involving the death of another Iraqi teenager, four British soldiers were acquitted of manslaughter.[17][18]

August 2003

Hanan Saleh Matrud, an eight-year-old Iraqi girl, was killed on August 21, 2003, by a soldier from the King's Regiment when a Warrior armoured vehicle stopped near an alley leading to her home. Three or four soldiers exited the vehicle, attracting a group of children, including Hanan. Accounts of what happened next differ. The soldiers claimed they came under attack from a mob throwing stones, prompting a "warning shot" to be fired.

However, local witnesses alleged that the crowd consisted only of children, who had been "coaxed into the open by the soldiers' offers of chocolate." Hanan was shot in the lower torso and rushed by the soldiers to a Czech-run hospital, where she died the following day after an unsuccessful operation. According to the Ministry of Defence (MOD), "in the absence of impartial witness evidence or forensic evidence to suggest a soldier had acted outside the rules of engagement, no crime was established." In May 2004, following an intervention by Amnesty International, Hanan's family submitted a formal claim for proper compensation, which was under assessment by the MOD as of that time.[19]

September 2003

Main article: Death of Baha Mousa On September 14, Baha Mousa, a 26-year-old hotel receptionist, was arrested along with six other men and taken to a British military base. While in detention, Mousa and the other captives were hooded, severely beaten, and assaulted by several soldiers at the base. Two days later, Mousa was found dead. [citation needed] A post-mortem examination revealed that Mousa had sustained multiple injuries—at least 93—including fractured ribs and a broken nose, which were identified as contributing factors to his death.[20] Seven members of the Queen's Lancashire Regiment were tried on charges related to the ill-treatment of detainees, including war crimes under the International Criminal Court Act 2001. On September 19, 2006, Corporal Donald Payne pleaded guilty to a charge of inhumane treatment of persons, making him the first member of the British Armed Forces to plead guilty to a war crime.[21] He was subsequently sentenced to one year in prison and expelled from the army.

The BBC reported that the six other soldiers were cleared of any wrongdoing.[22] The Independent stated that the charges against them had been dropped, with the presiding judge, Justice Ronald McKinnon, noting: "None of those soldiers has been charged with any offence, simply because there is no evidence against them as a result of a more or less obvious closing of ranks."[23]

January 2004

On January 1, Ghanem Kadhem Kati, an unarmed young man, was shot twice in the back by a British soldier at the door of his home. Troops had arrived at the scene after hearing gunfire, which neighbors reported was coming from a wedding party. Six weeks later, investigators from the Royal Military Police exhumed the teenager's body. However, no compensation has been offered, and the inquiry's conclusion has yet to be announced.[24] Footage from the gun camera of a US Apache helicopter killing 3 suspected Iraqi insurgents near al-Taji.[25] Originally shown on ABC TV.

Video footage from the gun camera of a U.S. Apache helicopter in Iraq, showing the killing of suspected Iraqi insurgents, was aired on ABC TV.[26] The case sparked controversy due to the ambiguity of the video. In the footage, a cylindrical object is tossed on the ground in a field. The U.S. military identified the object as an RPG or mortar tube and subsequently fired upon the individuals. However, IndyMedia UK suggested that the objects might have been harmless tools or implements. The publication also alleged that the helicopter fired upon a man who appeared to be wounded, which they argued would contradict international laws.[27][28] Retired U.S. Army General Robert Gard stated on German television that, in his opinion, the killings were "inexcusable murders."[29]

April 2004

On April 14, Lieutenant Ilario Pantano of the United States Marine Corps killed two unarmed captives. Pantano claimed that the captives had advanced on him in a threatening manner. The officer presiding over his Article 32 hearing recommended a court-martial for "body desecration." However, all charges against Pantano were dropped due to a lack of credible evidence or testimony. He later separated from the Marine Corps with an honorable discharge.

In February 2006, a video showing a group of British soldiers apparently beating several Iraqi teenagers was posted on the internet and soon broadcast on major television networks worldwide. The video, filmed in April 2004, was taken from an upper storey of a building in the southern Iraqi town of Al-Amarah. It shows a crowd of Iraqis outside a coalition compound. After an altercation in which members of the crowd reportedly threw rocks and an improvised grenade at the soldiers, the soldiers rushed the crowd. They brought some Iraqi teenagers into the compound and proceeded to beat them.

The video also includes a voiceover, apparently by the cameraman, taunting the beaten teenagers. The person recording could be heard saying: Oh, yes! Oh Yes! Now you gonna get it. You little kids. You little motherfucking bitch!, you little motherfucking bitch.[30] The event was broadcast in mainstream media, leading the British government and military to condemn it. The incident raised particular concerns for British soldiers, who had previously enjoyed a more favorable position than American soldiers in the region. Following the incident, there were media reports expressing concerns about the safety of soldiers in the country.

While the tape received some criticism from Iraq, it was relatively muted, and media outlets found individuals willing to speak out. The Royal Military Police conducted an investigation, but the prosecuting authorities determined that there was insufficient evidence to justify court-martial proceedings.[31]

May 2004

In May 2004, a British soldier identified as M004 mistreated captured, unarmed prisoners of war during a "tactical questioning" at Camp Abu Naji. [citation needed] See: Mukaradeeb wedding party massacre On May 19, 2004, the village of Mukaradeeb was attacked by American helicopters, resulting in the deaths of 42 men, women, and children. The casualties included 11 women and 14 children, as confirmed by Hamdi Noor al-Alusi, the manager of the nearest hospital. Western journalists also viewed the bodies of the children before they were buried.[32]

November 2005

See: Haditha killings 2005 Marine Killings in Haditha. On November 19, 24 Iraqis were killed, at least 15 of whom, and allegedly all, were non-combatant civilians. All are believed to have been killed by a group of U.S. Marines. The ongoing investigation into the incident claimed to have found evidence that "supports accusations that U.S. Marines deliberately shot civilians, including unarmed women and children," according to an anonymous Pentagon official.[33]

March 2006

See: Mahmudiyah killings On March 12, an Iraqi girl was raped and murdered along with her family in the Mahmudiyah killings. The incident led to the prosecution of the offenders and sparked a number of reprisal attacks against U.S. troops by insurgent forces. See: Ishaqi incident On March 15, 11 Iraqi civilians were allegedly bound and executed by U.S. troops in what is known as the "Ishaqi incident." A U.S. investigation concluded that military personnel had acted appropriately and followed the proper rules of engagement, responding to hostile fire and gradually escalating force until the threat was eliminated. The Iraqi government rejected the American conclusions. In September 2011, the Iraqi government reopened their investigation after WikiLeaks published a leaked diplomatic cable highlighting concerns raised by U.N. inspector Philip Alston, the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary, or Arbitrary Executions.[34]

April 2006

See: Hamdania incident On April 26, U.S. Marines shot and killed an unarmed Iraqi man. An investigation by the Naval Criminal Investigative Service led to charges of murder, kidnapping, and conspiracy related to the cover-up of the incident. The defendants include seven Marines and a Navy Corpsman. As of February 2007, five of the defendants had pleaded guilty to lesser charges of kidnapping and conspiracy and agreed to testify against the remaining defendants, who face murder charges. Additional Marines from the same battalion faced lesser charges of assault related to the use of physical force during interrogations of suspected insurgents.

May 2006

Main article: Operation Iron Triangle § Iron Triangle Murders On May 9, U.S. troops from the 101st Airborne Division executed three male Iraqi detainees at the Muthana Chemical Complex. An investigation and lengthy court proceedings followed. Spc. William Hunsaker and Pfc. Corey Clagett both pleaded guilty to murder and were each sentenced to 18 years for premeditated murder. Spc. Juston Graber pleaded guilty to aggravated assault for shooting one of the wounded detainees and was sentenced to nine months.

A fourth soldier, Staff Sgt. Ray Girouard of Sweetwater, Tennessee, was convicted of obstruction of justice, conspiracy to obstruct justice, and violation of a general order.[35][36]

Human rights in northern Iraq

In Iraqi Kurdistan, according to a 1995 Amnesty International report, the "prime responsibility for human rights abuses lies with the two parties holding the reins of power in Iraqi Kurdistan – the KDP and PUK," due to their political and military dominance. Amnesty reported that Francis Yusuf Shabo, an Assyrian Christian politician responsible for addressing complaints by Assyrian Christians about disputed villages, was shot dead on May 31, 1993, in Duhok, and no one had been brought to justice. Similarly, Lazar Mikho Hanna (known as Abu Nasir), another Assyrian Christian politician, was shot dead on June 14, 1993, in Duhok.

Amnesty criticized the impunity granted to Kurdish political parties' armed and special forces, noting that assailants were not held accountable. The report highlighted the "active undermining of the judiciary and the lack of respect for its independence by the political parties." It also documented incidents where Kurdish forces "arrested people arbitrarily," tortured detainees, killed civilians, and failed to bring perpetrators to justice.[37] The UNHCR reported incidents of violence against political opponents and minorities in areas under Kurdish control.

Minority leaders have alleged that Kurdish political parties and forces have subjected them to violence, forced assimilation, discrimination, political marginalization, and arbitrary arrests and detention. The UNHCR noted that Kurdish parties and forces have been "considered responsible for arbitrary arrests, incommunicado detention, and torture of political opponents and members of ethnic/religious minorities." The report also highlighted complaints from Christians about Kurdish attempts to assimilate them, as well as allegations of "the use of force, discrimination, and electoral fraud by Kurdish parties and militias." One notable incident occurred in October 2006, when KRG forces reportedly raided the building of a Christian media organization and detained its staff.

The UNHCR reported claims from Christian parties alleging "harassment and forced assimilation by Kurdish militias in Kirkuk and surrounding areas, with the aim of incorporating these areas into the Region of Kurdistan." Christians have accused Kurdish parties and their military forces of engaging in "acts of violence and discrimination, arbitrary arrests and detention on sectarian grounds, political marginalization (including through electoral manipulations), monopolization of government offices, and altering demographics to incorporate Kirkuk and other mixed areas into the Region of Kurdistan."

The Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) described this strategy as a form of "soft ethnic cleansing."[38] According to the UNHCR, Christians have repeatedly complained about ongoing Kurdification efforts. The U.S. State Department also reported that "Kurdish authorities abused and discriminated against minorities in the North, including Turkmen, Arabs, Christians, and Shabak." The UNHCR further noted that Kurdish parties "denied services to certain villages, arrested minorities without due process, detained them in undisclosed locations, and pressured minority schools to teach in the Kurdish language."[39][note 1] Additionally, Christians and Shabak people alleged that in the 2005 elections, "non-resident Kurds entered polling centers, and over 200 votes were cast illegally before the Multi-National Force intervened to stop the voting irregularities."[40] In 2005, a peaceful demonstration by Shabak people "turned violent after KDP gunmen shot at the crowd."[41][42] The UNHCR reported that Christians were at "risk of arbitrary arrest and incommunicado detention" by Kurdish forces.

The Washington Post highlighted extrajudicial detentions as early as 2005, describing a "concerted and widespread initiative" by Kurdish parties to assert authority in Kirkuk in an increasingly provocative manner. The report noted that arbitrary arrests and abductions by Kurdish militias had "greatly exacerbated tensions along purely ethnic lines." The UN Assistance Mission for Iraq's Human Rights Office (UNAMI HRO) stated in 2007 that religious minorities "face increasing threats, intimidation, and detentions, often in KRG facilities run by Kurdish intelligence and security forces."[43] The Washington Post estimated that there were 600 or more extrajudicial transfers, with detainees reporting "arbitrary arrests, incommunicado detentions, the use of torture, and unlawful confiscation of property."[44] Abuses by Kurdish forces ranged from "threats and intimidation to detention in undisclosed locations without due process."[45] The Kurdish parties’ plans to incorporate "disputed areas" like Kirkuk into Kurdistan were met with resistance from Christian, Arab, and Turkmen groups.

The UNHCR noted that Christians and Arabs in Mosul, Kirkuk, and surrounding areas, which are "under de facto control of the KRG," have become victims of threats, harassment, and arbitrary detention. The UNHCR also reported that Christian and Arab internally displaced people (IDPs) face discrimination and that those expressing opposition to the Kurdish parties, such as by participating in demonstrations, risk "arbitrary arrest and detention."

The KDP and PUK have been "repeatedly accused of nepotism, corruption, and lack of internal democracy," according to the UNHCR. Journalists have claimed that press freedom is restricted and that criticism of the ruling parties can result in physical harassment, the seizure of cameras and notebooks, and arrest.[46] For example, Kamal Sayid Qadir was sentenced to 30 years in prison after writing critically about Kurdish leader Masoud Barzani. The sentence was later reduced due to international pressure.[38][47] The UNHCR also reported arbitrary detentions of suspected political opponents by Kurdish authorities. Minorities have complained about "forcible assimilation into Kurdish society," increased discrimination against the non-Kurdish population, and efforts to dominate and "kurdify" traditionally mixed areas like Kirkuk. A 2006 poll conducted in Erbil, Sulaymaniyah, and Dahuk revealed that 79% of Kurds opposed allowing Arabs to enter Iraqi Kurdistan, and 63% opposed their settlement in the region.[38] Assyrian groups have stated that Kurdish authorities alter historical and geographical facts in school textbooks. For example, Assyrian Christian places are reportedly given new Kurdish names, and historical or Biblical figures are claimed to be Kurdish.[48][49] The American Mesopotamian Organization (AMO) demanded an official apology from Kurdistan President Massoud Barzani for the murder of Assyrians by Kurds in the past, alleging that thousands of Assyrian Christians were killed in the region over the last century. The AMO also criticized a message from Barzani on the occasion of Assyrian Martyrs Remembrance Day, which coincided with the 80th anniversary of the Semile massacre. The massacre, conducted by Kurdish general Bakr Sidqi, was referenced in Barzani's message, which controversially portrayed the Assyrians killed in the Simmele massacre as martyrs in the "Kurdistan liberation movement."[50][51] Assyrians in the Iraqi Kurdistan region face significant discrimination in various fields of work. Christian Assyrians are often limited to jobs as salespeople in liquor shops or as beauticians in salons, making them targets for Muslim extremists. In 2011, many Assyrian shops were burned. Additionally, Assyrians are reportedly excluded from professions such as police officers, soldiers, journalists for major media outlets, judges, and senior positions within educational institutions.

Local Assyrian history in the KRG-controlled area is often rebranded as Kurdish history. City names have been changed to Kurdish, and Assyrian heritage sites are reportedly neglected or destroyed. Furthermore, Assyrian history is not acknowledged in school textbooks, museums, or during memorial days.[52] There are also claims that Kurdish criminal organizations force Assyrian girls, particularly vulnerable refugees from southern Iraq, into prostitution. Those who refuse reportedly face death threats. These organizations are said to have ties to political leaders, enabling them to quickly issue passports and send these girls to European Union countries to work in the sex trade.[52] Assyrians allege that Kurds are actively working to "Kurdify" the local Christian population in northern Iraq. Reports indicate that Christians are sometimes forced to identify as Kurds to access essential services like education or healthcare. Similarly, Yazidis and Shabaks are not recognized as distinct ethnicities, and Assyrians from northern Iraq are increasingly pressured to identify as "Kurdistani" or "Kurdish Christians."

The KRG has also been accused of discriminatory practices against non-Kurdish minorities. Many Assyrians and Yazidis in the Nineveh Plains claim that the KRG has confiscated their property without compensation and has begun constructing settlements on their land. There have also been allegations of killings of Assyrians by agents of Kurdish political parties. Reports suggest that the KRG uses tactics such as intimidation, threats, restricted access to services, arbitrary arrests, and extrajudicial detentions to pressure political opponents and ordinary members of minority communities into supporting the KRG’s efforts to expand into disputed territories.[note 2] In 2014, Assyrians accused the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) of systematically disarming and abandoning Assyrian and other minority communities in anticipation of an ISIS assault. The KRG reportedly distributed notices to Assyrians in northern Iraq, demanding their complete disarmament and assuring them that the Kurdish Peshmerga would protect them against ISIS. However, when ISIS launched its attacks, the Peshmerga abruptly retreated.

A similar situation occurred in the Sinjar region and Shingal, where Kurdish Peshmerga forces retreated as ISIS advanced in 2014.[53][54] Peshmerga General Holgard Hekmat, a spokesman for the Peshmerga Ministry, admitted in an interview with SpiegelOnline: “Our soldiers just ran away. It’s a shame and apparently a reason why they invent such allegations.”[55][56] As a result of these events, approximately 150,000 Assyrian Christians were violently displaced from their ancestral homes in the Nineveh Plains.[57] A KRG official was quoted in a Reuters article in 2014, stating, “ISIL gave us in two weeks what Maliki couldn’t give us in eight years.”[57] Some Assyrians activists claim they have suffered not only from Arabization but also from Kurdification in Iraqi Kurdistan. These activists allege that the number of Christians living in the region has declined due to the destruction of villages and the implementation of Kurdification policies.[58] Historically, Christians, including Assyrian Christians, made up a much larger proportion of the population in northern Iraq and Iraqi Kurdistan than they do today. Their numbers have significantly decreased due to massacres, displacement, and other factors.

Additionally, the region is home to crypto-Christians–individuals who outwardly identify as Kurdish Muslims but retain memories of their Armenian or Nestorian Christian heritage. Relations between the remaining Christian population and the Kurds have often been strained.[59] According to Assyrian expert Michael Youash, some Christians became refugees because Kurds seized their land, and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) failed to assist them in reclaiming it.[60] In 2007, Youash also reported "numerous instances of Kurdish authorities discriminating against minorities in the North," noting that authorities denied services to certain villages, arrested minorities without due process, and pressured minority schools to teach in Kurdish.[60] Additionally, reports indicate that Christians who lack political representation struggle to expand their schools and often face exclusion from anything beyond basic funding.[58] Assyrian groups criticized the Kurdish authorities' investigations into a series of bombings targeting Christians in 1998 and 1999.[61] Assyrians have also been victims of attacks by the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and have often been caught in intra-Kurdish conflicts. For instance, in 1997, six Assyrians were killed during a PKK attack in Dohuk.[61] A 1999 U.S.

government country report cited allegations by the Assyrian International News Agency about the murder and rape of Helena Aloun Sawa, an Assyrian housekeeper for a KDP politician. Assyrians alleged that this case fit a "well-established pattern" of Kurdish authorities' complicity in attacks against Assyrian Christians in northern Iraq.[61] In more recent times, some scholars have noted that in northern Iraq, particularly in the area of "ancient Assyria," Kurdish expansion has come at the expense of the Assyrian population. Due to both Arab and Kurdish intimidation policies, particularly by the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), the Aramaic-speaking Christian population has been significantly reduced. It has been claimed that Kurds have "raised impediments to the acquisition of international aid for development, attempted to prevent the establishment of Aramaic language schools, and blocked the creation of Christian Assyrian schools." These issues have also been criticized by the U.S. State Department.

Additionally, attacks on Christians have been perpetrated by both Arab and Kurdish Islamist groups, such as ISIS and the Kurdish Ansar ul-Islam.[62][63][note 3] Kurdish forces have also been accused of harassing Arab residents.[64][65] Assyrian Christian refugees have been blocked from returning to their villages across the Nineveh Plain by the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG), according to a report from The Investigative Project on Terrorism. Jeff Gardiner, director of Restore Nineveh Now, stated, "The Kurdish authorities did not protect the people of the Nineveh Plain. In a way, this was enabled by the Kurdish government. They really set them [Assyrians] up for this catastrophic outcome." Gardiner dismissed claims of a security risk, calling the KRG's actions a "land grab."

Robert Nicholson of The Philos Project remarked, "For months we've been receiving numerous reports from Assyrian Christians and Yazidis that Kurdish forces are using the fog of war to seize land that rightfully belongs to victims of genocide. Each week those reports are increasing. The Nineveh Plain has never been a Kurdish territory. It belongs to the Christians (Assyrians) and Yazidis who have been living there for thousands of years." Members of the Nineveh Protection Units, an Assyrian militia, have faced obstruction by the KRG, with their movements impeded by Kurdish forces.[66] In a letter to Kurdistani President Masoud Barzani, John McCain expressed concern about "reports of land confiscation and statements you have made regarding Kurdish territorial claims to the Nineveh Plains region."

According to Gardner, "This is nothing new. Assyrian Christians complained about the illegal settlement of Kurdistani families on Assyrian land in the early 1990s. The ultimate strategy aims to unify Iraq's Kurds with those in Syria and Turkey in a broader Kurdish state."[67][68][69] In December 2011, hundreds of Kurds in Zakho burned and destroyed Christian Assyrian businesses and hotels after Friday prayers. Human rights groups suggested that the riots were planned by Kurdish authorities, noting that security representatives had made inquiries about liquor stores three days before the riots and that security forces did not intervene to stop the violence. Assyrians also face discrimination in the labor market and are burdened with administrative tasks, such as the annual requirement for Internally Displaced Persons to obtain a residence permit.

Assyrian students are treated and graded differently from Kurdish students. Additionally, Assyrians "suffer abuses and discrimination as a result of the KRG's aspirations to extend its control and its plans to reshape the demographics of Mosul and the Nineveh Plains." An official police force composed of Assyrians "has not been established due to massive resistance from Kurdish groups."[70] Government complicity in "religiously motivated discrimination has been reported in the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG)." According to the State Department, Christians "living in areas north of Mosul asserted that the KRG confiscated their property without compensation," and Assyrian Christians also alleged that the Kurdish Democratic Party-dominated judiciary routinely discriminates against non-Muslims. Chaldo-Assyrian Christians have stated that KRG officials "deny Christians key social benefits, including employment and housing," and that "foreign reconstruction assistance for Assyrian communities is being controlled by the KRG." KRG officials have used "public works projects to divert water and other vital resources from Assyrian to Kurdish communities." These deprivations led to a mass exodus, followed by "the seizure and conversion of abandoned Assyrian property by the local Kurdish population." Turkmen groups report "similar abuses by Kurdish officials, suggesting a pattern of pervasive discrimination, harassment, and marginalization."

Violence against Iraq's Christian community "remains a significant concern, particularly in Baghdad and the northern Kurdish regions," with a pattern of "official discrimination, harassment, and marginalization by KRG officials exacerbating these conditions."[71][72][73] Kurdish groups have been accused of attempting to annex territories belonging to Assyrians, "claiming that these areas are historically Kurdish." Since 2003, "Kurdish peshmerga, security forces, and political parties have moved into these territories, establishing de facto control over many of the disputed areas." Assyrians, Shabak, and Turkomen groups have accused Kurdish forces "of engaging in systematic abuses and discrimination against them to further Kurdish territorial claims." These accusations include "reports of Kurdish officials interfering with minorities' voting rights, encroaching on, seizing, and refusing to return minority land, conditioning the provision of services and assistance to minority communities on support for Kurdish expansion, forcing minorities to identify themselves as either Arabs or Kurds, and impeding the formation of local minority police forces."[74]

Freedom of speech and political freedom

Kurdish officials in Iraq have accused the ruling Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), led by Masoud Barzani, of "all kinds of intimidation," corruption, and ballot stuffing.[75][65] During the 2005 elections, "Kurdish authorities, tasked with delivering ballot boxes to Assyrian districts in Iraqi Kurdistan, failed to do so, while Assyrian election workers were fired upon and killed." As a consequence, the Assyrian Democratic Movement was marginalized.[76]

The current state of human rights

Numerous human rights organizations and Shiite officials have raised significant criticisms, alleging that Sunni groups have systematically kidnapped, tortured, and killed Shiites or those they consider enemies. Amnesty International has also extensively criticized the Iraqi government for its handling of the Walid Yunis Ahmad case, in which an ethnically Turkmen journalist from Iraqi Kurdistan was held for ten years without charge or trial.[77] According to the Human Rights Watch annual report, the human rights situation in Iraq remains deplorable. Since 2015, the country has been embroiled in a bloody armed conflict involving ISIS and a coalition of Kurdish forces, central Iraqi government forces, pro-government militias, and a United States-led international air campaign. The United Nations reported that 3.2 million Iraqis were displaced due to the conflict. Furthermore, the international organization stated that the warring parties employed various methods, including extrajudicial executions, suicide attacks, and airstrikes, which resulted in the deaths and injuries of over 20,000 civilians.[78] An Amnesty International report concluded that the Peshmerga forces of the semi-autonomous Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) were preventing residents of Arab villages and Arab residents of mixed Arab-Kurdish towns from returning to their homes. In some cases, the Peshmerga forces had destroyed or allowed the destruction of homes and property, seemingly to prevent residents from returning in the future. Amnesty reported that Arab houses were often looted, intentionally burned, bulldozed, or blown up after fighting had ended, and the Peshmerga had taken control of these areas. These actions were not isolated incidents but part of a broader pattern.

The report emphasized that the forced displacement of Arab residents and the extensive, unlawful destruction of civilian homes and property violated international humanitarian law and should be investigated as war crimes. For example, the village of Tabaj Hamid was completely razed, and in Jumeili, 95% of all walls and structures were destroyed. Amnesty International researchers reported being apprehended by Peshmerga forces, who escorted them out of the area and prevented them from taking photographs.[79][80][81][82] Amnesty stated that the deliberate demolition of civilian homes is unlawful under international humanitarian law and considered these acts of forced displacement to constitute war crimes.[83] The organization also urged KRG authorities to conduct prompt and independent investigations into all deaths that occurred during protests against the KDP, such as those in October 2015, and to disclose the findings.[84] Amnesty International criticized the Peshmerga forces of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and Kurdish militias in northern Iraq for bulldozing, blowing up, and burning thousands of homes in what appears to be an effort to uproot Arab communities. The report, Banished and Dispossessed: Forced Displacement and Deliberate Destruction in Northern Iraq, is based on field investigations in Iraq. It stated, “Tens of thousands of Arab civilians who were forced to flee their homes because of fighting are now struggling to survive in makeshift camps in desperate conditions. Many have lost their livelihoods and all their possessions, and with their homes destroyed, they have nothing to return to. By barring the displaced from returning to their villages and destroying their homes, KRG forces are further exacerbating their suffering.” The report provided evidence of forced displacement and large-scale destruction of homes in villages and towns by Peshmerga forces.[85][86][87][88][89] Human Rights Watch also reported that Kurds denied Arabs the right to return to their homes while allowing Kurds free movement, even permitting Kurds to move into homes that belonged to Arabs.[90] In a 2016 report titled ‘Where Are We Supposed to Go?’: Destruction and Forced Displacement in Kirkuk, Amnesty International documented cases of Kurdish authorities demolishing and bulldozing homes and forcibly displacing hundreds of Arab residents.[91] In 2005, during a demonstration by the Democratic Shabak Coalition, the KDP opened fire on protestors, killing two Assyrians and wounding several Assyrians and Shabak participants.[92] Additionally, Assyrian groups have accused Kurdish authorities of election rigging in northern Iraq and of preventing Assyrian representation in politics.[93] The Shabak people have also suffered from discrimination. Hunain al-Qaddo, a Shabak politician, told Human Rights Watch that "the Peshmerga have no genuine interest in protecting his community and that Kurdish security forces are more interested in controlling Shabaks and their leaders than protecting them." He further stated that Shabaks are "suffering at the hands of the Peshmerga and that the Kurdish government refuses to let the Iraqi armed forces protect them or allow them to establish their own Shabak police force to safeguard their community."

Kurdish forces have been implicated in some attacks against Shabaks. In 2008, Mullah Khadim Abbas, the leader of the Shabak Democratic Gathering—a group opposing the incorporation of Shabak villages into the KRG—was killed only 150 meters from a Peshmerga outpost. Before his assassination, Abbas had angered Kurdish authorities by criticizing Shabaks who supported Kurdish agendas and denouncing Kurdish policies that, in his view, undermined the identity of the Shabak community.

In 2009, Shabak lawmaker al-Qaddo survived an assassination attempt in the Nineveh Plains. He told Human Rights Watch that the attackers wore Kurdish security uniforms. Al-Qaddo alleged that the Kurdish government aimed to impose its will on the Shabak and acquire their lands by silencing him. Shabak leaders have frequently complained about the lack of accountability for killings. In some incidents, the KDP was accused of failing to investigate the deaths of non-Kurdish civilians at the hands of the Peshmerga. Human Rights Watch noted that "the root of the problem is the near-universal perception among Kurdish leaders that minority groups are, in fact, Kurds." The report further stated that Kurdish authorities have sometimes dealt harshly with Yazidi and Shabak individuals who resisted attempts to impose a Kurdish identity on them.[94]

Sectarian warfare in Iraq

Iraq experienced a state of sectarian civil war from 2006 to 2008. During this period, small groups and militias carried out bombings in civilian areas and assassinations targeting officials at various levels, as well as Shiites and smaller religious minorities. Secular-oriented individuals, officials of the new government, aides to the United States (such as translators), and individuals and families from the country's various religious groups faced violence and death threats.

Refugee response to threats to life

See also Refugees of Iraq. As a result of attempted murders and death threats, approximately 2 million Iraqis fled the country, primarily seeking refuge in Syria, Jordan, and Egypt.[95]

Propaganda

On February 17, 2006, then U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld discussed the emergence of new realities in the media age:[96] "In Iraq, for example, the U.S. military command, working closely with the Iraqi government and the U.S. embassy, has sought nontraditional means to provide accurate information to the Iraqi people in the face of aggressive campaign of disinformation. Yet this has been portrayed as inappropriate; for example, the allegations of someone in the military hiring a contractor, and the contractor allegedly paying someone to print a story—a true story—but paying to print a story."

On March 3, 2006, Army General George Casey stated, "The U.S. military plans to continue paying Iraqi newspapers to publish articles favorable to the United States after an inquiry found no fault with the controversial practice." Casey explained that an internal review had concluded the U.S. military was not violating U.S. law or Pentagon guidelines with its information operations campaign. As part of this campaign, U.S. troops and a private contractor wrote pro-American articles and paid to have them published in Iraqi media without attribution.[97] The legal status of freedom of speech and the press in Iraq remains unclear. While both freedoms are guaranteed in the Iraqi Constitution, they include exemptions for Islamic morality and national security. Additionally, the 1969 Iraqi Criminal Code contains vague prohibitions against using the press or any electronic means of communication for "indecent" purposes.

Women's rights

Main article: Women in Iraq Prevalence of female genital mutilation in Iraq for women aged 15–49 using UNICEF "Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting, 2013.[98] There is a more recent 2016 survey here:.[99] Green = Less than 3%, Blue = 15-25%, Red = Above 50%. The highest prevalence rates of FGM are in Kirkuk (20%), Sulaymaniyah (54%) and Erbil (58%). Women in Iraq at the beginning of the 21st century face a status that is influenced by many factors, including wars (most recently the Iraq War), sectarian religious conflict, debates concerning Islamic law and Iraq's Constitution, cultural traditions, and modern secularism. Hundreds of thousands of Iraqi women have been widowed as a result of a series of wars and internal conflicts. Women's rights organizations continue to struggle against harassment and intimidation as they work to promote improvements to women's status in law, education, the workplace, and many other spheres of Iraqi life. According to a 2008 report in the Washington Post, the Kurdistan region of Iraq is one of the few places in the world where female genital mutilation has been rampant.[100] In 2008, the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) stated that honor killings are a serious concern in Iraq, particularly in Iraqi Kurdistan.[101] Honor killings are common in the region, and women also face forced and underage marriage, domestic violence, and polygamy issues. Since the early 1990s, several thousand Iraqi Kurdish women have died from self-immolation.[102]

Other human rights

The United States, through the CPA, abolished the death penalty (which has since been reinstated) and ordered that the Criminal Code of 1969 (as amended in 1985) and the Civil Code of 1974 would be the operating legal system in Iraq. However, there has been some debate regarding the extent to which the CPA rules have been applied. For example, the Iraqi Criminal Code of 1969 (as amended in 1985) does not prohibit the formation of trade unions, and the Iraqi Constitution promises that such organizations will be recognized (a right under Article 23 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights). However, for some reason, the Iraqi courts and special tribunals seem to be operating under a slightly revised version of the 1988 legal code, which means that the 1987 ban on unions might still be in place.

Likewise, while the Iraqi Criminal Code of 1969 or the apparent 1988 edition does not expressly prohibit homosexual relations between consenting adults in private (a right under a United Nations Human Rights Commission ruling in 1994), scattered reports suggest that homosexuality is still being treated as a crime, possibly a capital crime under a 2001 amendment that technically should not exist. For more information on this topic, see Gay rights in Iraq.

Post COVID-19 rights

Further information: COVID-19 pandemic in Iraq During COVID-19, the Iraqi government implemented stricter curfews and limited shopping hours instead of full lockdowns, aiming to keep the economy afloat. However, human welfare significantly worsened due to droughts in the area. The modern government did not provide adequate assistance to the majority of the population during the crisis. All but two refugee camps were closed, and internally displaced people were targeted by armed forces. Many of these displaced families had been fleeing the Syrian civil war. In December and November 2021, heavy rainfall caused flash floods, leading to many families becoming homeless or displaced, both internally and externally.

Politics of Iraq According to the constitution adopted in 2005, the Republic of Iraq is defined as a federal democratic parliamentary republic. Executive power is exercised by the Prime Minister of Iraq who heads the Council of Ministers (i.e. the federal government). The President of Iraq is the head of state with largely ceremonial powers, while legislative and judicial power is vested in the Council of Representatives and Supreme Judicial Council respectively.

The Economist Intelligence Unit rated Iraq an "authoritarian regime" in 2023.[1] The Regimes of the World index rated Iraq 2024 an electoral autocracy.[1]

System of government

Overview

Council of Representatives of Iraq The Republic of Iraq is defined under the current constitution as a democratic, federal parliamentary republic.[2] The system of government is composed of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, as well as numerous independent commissions. Islam is the official religion of the state and a foundation source of legislation, and no law may be enacted that contradicts its established provisions; furthermore, no law may be enacted that contradicts the principles of democracy or those basic rights and freedoms stipulated in the constitution.[3] The current constitution provides for decentralisation according to which the federal regions have their own branches of government and governorates can exercise a degree of autonomy, but are governed by the provisions of the constitution of Iraq.

Executive branch

The executive branch is represented by the Council of Ministers headed by the Prime Minister. The President of the Republic is not part of the council of ministers and is not the head of any executive organ, but whose constitutional duty is mainly in naming the prime minister immediately after election and thereafter working under the command of the prime minister who is in charge of forming the government, formulating the general policy of the State and acting as the commander-in-chief of the armed forces.

Legislative branch

The legislative branch is composed of the Council of Representatives and a Federation Council.[4] As of August 2012, the Federation Council had not yet been convened.[5]

Council of Representatives

Main article: Council of Representatives of Iraq The Council of Representatives is the main elected body of Iraq. The Constitution defines the "number of members at a ratio of one representative per 100,000 Iraqi persons representing the entire Iraqi people."[6] The members are elected for terms of 4 years.[7] The council elects the President of Iraq; approves the appointment of the members of the Federal Court of Cassation, the Chief Public Prosecutor, and the President of Judicial Oversight Commission on proposal by the Higher Juridical Council; and approves the appointment of the Army Chief of Staff, his assistants and those of the rank of division commanders and above, and the director of the intelligence service, on proposal by the Cabinet.[8]

Federation Council

Main article: Federation Council of Iraq The Federation Council will be composed of representatives from the regions and the governorates that are not organized in a region. The council is to be regulated by law by the Council of Representatives.[9] As of February 2026, the Federation Council had not yet been convened.[10][5]

Judicial branch

Main article: Judiciary of Iraq The federal judiciary is represented by the Supreme Judicial Council of Iraq. The apex courts of Iraq are the Court of Cassation, and the Supreme Court. The judiciary is also composed of the Public Prosecution Department, the Judiciary Oversight Commission, and other federal courts that are regulated by law.[11] One such court is the Central Criminal Court.

Supreme Judicial Council

Main article: Supreme Judicial Council of Iraq The Supreme Judicial Council manages and supervises the affairs of the federal judiciary.[12] It oversees the affairs of the various judicial committees,[13] nominates the Chief Justice and members of the Court of Cassation, the Chief Public Prosecutor, and the Chief Justice of the Judiciary Oversight Commission, and drafts the budget of the judiciary.[12] In 2013, the Council of Representatives passed the Iraqi Federal Court Act, which forbids the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court from also being the head of the Judicial Council, and replaced him with the Chief Justice of the Court of Cassation.[14]

Court of Cassation

According to the Judicial Authority Law of 1963, the Court of Cassation is the apex court in ordinary law. The Court of Cassation is the supreme judicial body for all civil courts. It is headquartered in Baghdad and consists of a president, a sufficient number of vice-presidents, permanent judges, not less than fifteen permanent judges, delegated judges or rapporteur judges as needed.[15]

Supreme Court

Main article: Supreme Court of Iraq The Supreme Court is an independent judicial body that interprets the constitution and determines the constitutionality of laws and regulations. It settles disputes amongst or between the federal government and the regions and governorates, municipalities, and local administrations, and settles accusations directed against the President, the Prime Minister and the Ministers. It also ratifies the final results of the general elections for the Council of Representatives.[16] In November 2022, the president of the Supreme Judicial Council, Chief Justice Dr. Faiq Zaidan described the name “Federal Supreme Court” as a misnomer, and suggested that the name be changed to “Constitutional Court” befitting its authorities.[17]

Central Criminal Court

The Central Criminal Court of Iraq is the main criminal court of Iraq. [citation needed] The CCCI is based on an inquisitorial system and consists of two chambers: an investigative court, and a criminal court. [citation needed]

Independent Commissions

The Independent High Commission for Human Rights, the Independent High Electoral Commission, and the Commission of Integrity are independent commissions subject to monitoring by the Council of Representatives.[18] The Central Bank of Iraq, the Board of Supreme Audit, the Communications and Media Commission, and the Shiite Endowment Commission as well as the Sunni Endowment Commission are financially and administratively independent institutions attached to the Council of Ministers.[19] The Martyrs Foundation and the Political Prisoners Foundation are attached to the Council of Ministers as well.[20] The Federal Public Service Council regulates the affairs of the federal public service, including appointment and promotion.[21]

Federalism in Iraq

Main article: Federalism in Iraq

Federalism law

Article 114 of the Constitution of Iraq provided that no new region may be created before the Iraqi National Assembly has passed a law that provides the procedures for forming the region. A law was passed in October 2006 after an agreement was reached with the Iraqi Accord Front to form the constitutional review committee and to defer implementation of the law for 18 months. Legislators from the Iraqi Accord Front, Sadrist Movement and Islamic Virtue Party all opposed the bill.[22]

Federal regions

Main article: Federal regions of Iraq The constitution requires that the Council of Representatives enact a law which provides the procedures for forming a new region 6 months from the start of its first session.[23] A law was passed 11 October 2006 by a unanimous vote with only 138 of 275 representatives present, with the remaining representatives boycotting the vote.[24][25] Legislators from the Iraqi Accord Front, Sadrist Movement and Islamic Virtue Party all opposed the bill.[26] Under the law, a region can be created out of one or more existing governorates or two or more existing regions, and a governorate can also join an existing region to create a new region. A new region can be proposed by one third or more of the council members in each affected governorate plus 500 voters or by one tenth or more voters in each affected governorate. A referendum must then be held within three months, which requires a simple majority in favour to pass. In the event of competing proposals, the multiple proposals are put to a ballot and the proposal with the most supporters is put to the referendum. In the event of an affirmative referendum a Transitional Legislative Assembly is elected for one year, which has the task of writing a constitution for the Region, which is then put to a referendum requiring a simple majority to pass. The President, Prime Minister and Ministers of the region are elected by simple majority, in contrast to the Iraqi Council of Representatives which requires two thirds support.[25] The northern Kurdistan Region emerged in 1992 with its own local government and parliament officially recognised in 2005 following the adoption of the new constitution.[27]

Local government

The basic subdivisions of the country are the federal regions and governorates. Both regions and governorates are given broad autonomy with regions given additional powers such as control of internal security forces for the region such as police, security forces, and guards.[28]

Provinces

Main articles: Governorates of Iraq and districts of Iraq See also: Government of Baghdad Iraqi Governorates Iraq is divided into 19 governorates, which are further divided into districts: 1.​ Baghdād (بغداد) 2.​ Salāh ad-Dīn (صالح الدين) 3.​ Diyālā (ديالى) 4.​ Wāsit (واسط) 5.​ Maysān (ميسان) 6.​ Basra (البصرة) 7.​ Dhī Qār (ذي قار) 8.​ Al-Muthannā (المثنى) 9.​ Al-Qādisiyyah (القادسية) 10.​ Bābylon (بابل) 11.​ Karbalā' (كربالء) 12.​ Najaf (النجف) 13.​ Al-Anbar (األنبار) 14.​ Nineveh (نينوى) 15.​ Dohūk (دهوك) 16.​ Arbīl (أربيل) 17.​ Kirkuk (كركوك) 18.​ Sulaymāniyah (السليمانية) 19.​ Halabja (حلبجة)

Political parties

Main article: List of political parties in Iraq

Parliamentary alliances and parties

Other parties

Illegal parties

Elections

Main article: Elections in Iraq

Iraqi parliamentary election, January 2005

Main article: January 2005 Iraqi parliamentary election Iraqi police officers hold up their index fingers marked with purple indelible ink, a security measure to prevent double voting. Elections for the National Assembly of Iraq were held on January 30, 2005, in Iraq. The 275-member National Assembly was a parliament created under the Transitional Law during the Occupation of Iraq. The newly elected transitional Assembly was given a mandate to write the new and permanent Constitution of Iraq and exercised legislative functions until the new Constitution came into effect, and resulted in the formation of the Iraqi Transitional Government.

The United Iraqi Alliance, tacitly backed by Shia Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, led with some 48% of the vote. The Democratic Patriotic Alliance of Kurdistan was in second place with some 26% of the vote. Prime Minister Ayad Allawi's party, the Iraqi List, came third with some 14%. In total, twelve parties received enough votes to win a seat in the assembly. Low Arab Sunni turnout threatened the legitimacy of the election, which was as low as 2% in Anbar province. More than 100 armed attacks on polling places took place, killing at least 44 people (including nine suicide bombers) across Iraq, including at least 20 in Baghdad.

Iraqi parliamentary election, December 2005

Main article: December 2005 Iraqi parliamentary election Iraqis in the predominantly Sunni city of Husaybah, wait in lines to vote during the national election. Following the ratification of the Constitution of Iraq on 15 October 2005, a general election was held on 15 December to elect the permanent 275-member Iraqi Council of Representatives. The elections took place under a list system, whereby voters chose from a list of parties and coalitions. 230 seats were apportioned among Iraq's 18 governorates based on the number of registered voters in each as of the January 2005 elections, including 59 seats for Baghdad Governorate.[29] The seats within each governorate were allocated to lists through a system of Proportional Representation. An additional 45 "compensatory" seats were allocated to those parties whose percentage of the national vote total (including out of country votes) exceeds the percentage of the 275 total seats that they have been allocated. Women were required to occupy 25% of the 275 seats.[30] The change in the voting system gave more weight to Arab Sunni voters, who make up most of the voters in several provinces. It was expected that these provinces would thus return mostly Sunni Arab representatives, after most Sunnis boycotted the last election.

Turnout was high (79.6%). The White House was encouraged by the relatively low levels of violence during polling,[31] with one insurgent group making good on a promised election day moratorium on attacks, even going so far as to guard the voters from attack.[32] President Bush frequently pointed to the election as a sign of progress in rebuilding Iraq. However, post-election violence threatened to plunge the nation into civil war, before the situation began to calm in 2007. The election results themselves produced a shaky coalition government headed by Nouri al-Maliki.

Iraqi parliamentary election, 2010

Main article: 2010 Iraqi parliamentary election A parliamentary election was held in Iraq on 7 March 2010. The election decided the 325 members of the Council of Representatives of Iraq who will elect the Iraqi Prime Minister and President. The election resulted in a partial victory for the Iraqi National Movement, led by former Interim Prime Minister Ayad Allawi, which won a total of 91 seats, making it the largest alliance in the council. The State of Law Coalition, led by incumbent Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki, was the second largest grouping with 89 seats.

The election was rife with controversy.[33] Prior to the election, the Supreme Court in Iraq ruled that the existing electoral law/rule was unconstitutional,[34] and a new elections law made changes in the electoral system.[35] On 15 January 2010, the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) banned 499 candidates from the election due to alleged links with the Ba'ath Party.[36] Before the start of the campaign on 12 February 2010, IHEC confirmed that most of the appeals by banned candidates had been rejected and 456 of the initially banned candidates would not be allowed to run for the election.[37] There were numerous allegations of fraud,[38][39] and a recount of the votes in Baghdad was ordered on 19 April 2010.[40] On May 14, IHEC announced that after 11,298 ballot boxes had been recounted, there was no sign of fraud or violations. [citation needed] The new parliament opened on 14 June 2010.[41] After months of fraught negotiations, an agreement was reached on the formation of a new government on November 11.[42] Talabani would continue as president, Al-Maliki would stay on as prime minister and Allawi would head a new security council.

Iraqi parliamentary election, 2014

Main article: 2014 Iraqi parliamentary election Parliamentary elections were held in Iraq on 30 April 2014. The elections decided the 328 members of the Council of Representatives who will in turn elect the Iraqi President and Prime Minister.

Iraqi parliamentary election, 2018

Main article: 2018 Iraqi parliamentary election Parliamentary elections were held in Iraq on 12 May 2018.[43] The elections decided the 329 members of the Council of Representatives, the country's unicameral legislature, who in turn will elect the Iraqi president and prime minister.[44] The Iraqi parliament ordered a manual recount of the results on 6 June 2018.[45] On 10 June 2018, a storage site in Baghdad housing roughly half of the ballots from the May parliamentary election caught fire.[46]

Iraqi parliamentary election, 2021

Main article: 2021 Iraqi parliamentary election On 30 November 2021, the political bloc led by Shia leader Muqtada al-Sadr was confirmed the winner of the October parliamentary election. His Sadrist Movement, won a total of 73 out of the 329 seats in the parliament. The Taqadum, or Progress Party-led by Parliament Speaker Mohammed al-Halbousi, a Sunni – secured 37 seats. Former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's State of Law party got 33 seats in parliament. Al-Fatah alliance, whose main components are militia groups affiliated with the Iran-backed Popular Mobilisation Forces, sustained its crushing loss and snatched 17 seats. The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) received 31 seats, and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) gained 18.[47]

After the election 2022–2025

In June 2022, 73 members of parliament from the Sadrist movement, resigned.[48] On 27 October 2022, Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, close ally of former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, took the office to succeed Mustafa al-Kadhimi as new Prime Minister of Iraq.[49]

Iraqi parliamentary election, 2025

Main article: 2025 Iraqi parliamentary election On 17 November 2025, the Iraqi Independent High Electoral Commission announced that the Reconstruction and Development coalition, led by Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, topped the final results with 46 seats in the 329-member Council of Representatives, followed by the Progress (Taqaddum) party of former Parliament Speaker Mohammed al-Halbousi with 36 seats, and the State of Law coalition of former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki with 29 seats.[50] Subsequently, the Shia-led Coordination Framework declared that it had constituted itself as the largest parliamentary bloc by uniting its component parties, thereby positioning itself as a central force in government formation and parliamentary negotiations.[50]

Political issues

The Iraqi political system has been described as a sectarianized rentier state due to elitism, lobbying, corruption and identity politics.[51][52] The main political issues in Iraq were economy and unemployment according to a 2025 Gallup poll.[53]

Corruption

Main article: Corruption in Iraq According to Transparency International, Iraq's is the most corrupt government in the Middle East, and is described as a "hybrid regime" (between a "flawed democracy" and an "authoritarian regime").[54] The 2011 report "Costs of War" from Brown University's Watson Institute for International Studies concluded that U.S. military presence in Iraq has not been able to prevent this corruption, noting that as early as 2006, "there were clear signs that post-Saddam Iraq was not going to be the linchpin for a new democratic Middle East."[55]

Elite cartel ruling Iraq

During the regime of Saddam Hussein (1979–2003), several Iraqi opposition groups created a quota system by which Sunni Islamic, Shia Islamic, Kurdish and other religious or ethnic groups would be proportionally represented in a future new government. The U.S. in July 2003 selected the members of the Iraqi Governing Council, the forerunner of the first post–Hussein sovereign Iraqi interim government, according to that ethno-sectarian quota system.[56] The quota system adopted by the ruling elite came to be realised in the manner that, for instance, the presidency be held by a Kurd, the premiership (head of government) by a Shia and the speakership of the parliament by a Sunni. In addition to this, ministries and state institutions were to be allocated in the same manner as well.

Also in 2003, a "pact" (muhasasa ta’ifa) was struck by "the elite", holding that after a national election, the winning parties divide the ministerial positions in direct relationship to their success at the ballot box.[57] After 2003, a second agreement (muhasasa) was made, holding that ministries and their budgets and other political positions must be proportionally placed under the "control" of "religious [or sectarian or ethnic] groups", "depending mostly on a group's size", presuming such "groups" to be fully represented by one or several parties or lists taking part in the elections,[58] or that national governments should "represent the different ethnic, religious and sectarian identities that make up the Iraqi society", presuming that such "identities" are expressed or represented by existing political parties.[59] Such agreements between members of the elite to collude in order to avoid competition, improve their own profits, and dominate the market (of voters in a democracy), have been labeled "elite cartel".[59] The political parties themselves, once they win any ministry through the muhasasa system, benefit financially from state contracts awarded by them to companies run by their party members (see below, section Clientelism, patronage) what makes it even harder for them to step out of the muhasasa arrangements.[57] Or, as a researcher phrased it in 2020: "Such elite pacts are notoriously resistant to reform, particularly if any proposed change is perceived to undermine elite interests (…)".[60] Although the system functions informally, a group of Norwegian researchers in late 2020 asserted—while citing other researchers but not a basic source—that 54% of the ministry posts would 'normally' go to the Shia, 24% to the Sunni, 18% to the Kurds, and 4% to minorities including the Christians.[61] They suggested that the muhasasa system leads to "a closed system of elite rule… recycling the political elites irrespective of their performance", not urging or inciting the Iraqi politicians to act transparently or accountably or to respond to citizen demands and deliver benefits to the Iraqi population as a whole, but instead making them easily susceptible to corruption, nepotism, clientelism and patronage while focusing on their own (group's) interests and (elite's) survival and consolidation.[61] This muhasasa elite cartel (and connected problems) led to massive protests in Iraq in 2011, 2012–2013, 2015, 2016, 2018 and 2019–2021. Analysts have seen this muhasasa system to exist until at least late 2020.[62] The Abdul Mahdi Government of 2018 broke with elements of muhasasa. Although his anti-muhasasa Sadrist Movement retained plurality in the 2021 election, inability to form a government eventually led to the party's withdrawal from Parliament, allowing the rival parties to form another muhasasa-based government.[63]

Incompetent government

Those two muhasasa agreements in and after 2003 (see above) had the effect that, starting with the first post–2003 Iraqi government after elections in 2006, if a party "controlled" a ministry, it appointed also the top positions in their civil services to their party followers and faction members;[57] also the positions for senior public service were distributed on the basis of "ethnic, religious and/or party affiliation" rather than merit,[64] professional competence or experience.[59] This incompetence caused mismanagement in the successive Iraqi governments of Al-Maliki (2006–2014), Al-Abadi (2014–2018),[65][60] and also Abdul-Mahdi (2018–2020),[62][57] leading to hundreds of billions of dollars being wasted on failed projects and the neglect of electricity networks, the transportation sector, economic legislation, and other infrastructure,[65] as well as citizen demands not being responded to.[60] Such incompetence – next to other forms of political turmoil like corruption (see next subsection) and instability – is considered by many analysts to have also fostered the rise of ISIL, in 2014.[66] (During the formation of the Abdul Mahdi Government in 2018, this new prime minister attempted to break through the traditional muhasasa procedures, but there's no clear information as to how far he succeeded in that, or whether the Iraqi governments since 2018 worked more competently or less corruptly.)

Clientelism, patronage

Civil services being staffed – under these muhasasa agreements (see above) – according to party loyalty had the effect that state contracts would only be awarded by them to "party-affiliated companies and businesspeople",[59] who would be paid handsomely for their contracted services; even if they hardly, or not at all, actually delivered those services. Such manner of spending state finances has been labeled governmental contracting fraud and structural political corruption: not the general public but privileged companies were being served by the government.[57] This culture of clientelism[65] and "systemic political patronage"[67][56] produced a new class of entrepreneurs, getting rich through close relations with government officials and their lush government contracts.[65] Meanwhile, politicians themselves lived in wealth, self-enrichment and massive personal protection.[68][56]

Stagnant economy

The infrastructure not being maintained or modernized due to governmental incompetence and mismanagement (see above) severely hampered the development of private economic activity, therefore meaning the private sector could not absorb the half million of young people entering the job market every year.[65] This muhasasa-style 'cartel' government, due to its lack of accountability – politicians being "recycled ... irrespective of their performance" – provided too little incentives for those politicians to build a diversified and competitive economy or "deliver benefits to the population".[60]

Lack of commitment towards federalism

Since the adoption of the new Iraqi constitution in 2005, federalism with a heavy emphasis on decentralisation has been the official model of governance in Iraq. However, certain constitutional stipulations, such as those related to the creation of the Federation Council (the upper house of the legislature) have not been implemented, which remains an issue undermining the full implementation of federalism in the country. In September 2017, a one-sided referendum was held in Iraq's Kurdistan Region regarding Kurdish independence, which resulted in 92% (of those participating in the region) voting in favor of independence.[69] The referendum was rejected by the federal government and ruled as illegal by the Federal Supreme Court.[70] Following this, an armed conflict ensued between the federal government and the Kurdistan Regional Government which resulted in Kurdish defeat and capitulation; Kurdistan Region subsequently lost territory it had previously occupied, and the president of Kurdistan Region officially resigned,[71] and finally, the regional government announced that it would respect the Federal Supreme Court's ruling that no Iraqi province is allowed to secede, effectively abandoning the referendum.[72] According to a report published by The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, a U.S-based think tank, since Kurdistan Region's failed bid to gain independence, the federal government has been severely punishing it both politically and economically. In gradual steps, the federal government has consistently weakened Kurdistan Region's ability to administer its own affairs by revoking crucial authorities that had previously defined its autonomy.[73] Furthermore, since it won a pivotal ICC arbitration case, the federal government has also been refusing Kurdistan Region access to its most important source of income, namely, oil exports, and the latter has had no other option but to concede.[74] Some have argued that this signals the Iraqi government's intention to abandon federalism and return to a centralized political system,[75] and in a leaked letter sent in 2023 to the U.S president, the prime minister of Kurdistan region wrote of an impending collapse of Kurdistan Region.[76]

See also

Human rights in post-invasion Iraq

Women in Iraq The status of women in Iraq has been affected by wars, Islamic law, the Constitution of Iraq, cultural traditions, and secularism. Women's rights organizations in Iraq continue to struggle against harassment and intimidation while they work to promote improvements to women's status in the law, in education, the workplace, and many other spheres of Iraqi life. Abusive practices such as honor killings and forced marriages persist.

"Woman at the window" or "the lady of the window", one of the most famous Phoenician styles of the Nimrud Ivories. Excavated by a BISI team in the mid-20th century CE. Neo-Assyrian period, 9th-7th centuries BCE. From Nimrud, Mesopotamia, Iraq.

Historical background

See also: Women in Islam

Middle ages

In the seventh century, Arab Muslim forces successfully defeated the Persians; the Arabs that began ruling Mesopotamia named the country Iraq. In The Awakened: Women in Iraq, Doreen Ingrams wrote that women actively supported war efforts, citing Amina bint Qais, who "at the age of seventeen was the youngest woman to lead a medical team in one of these early battles."[1]: 21 During the subsequent Abbasid Caliphate, women "played active roles in various scientific, literary, economic, and even political spheres."[2] Among the most prominent female figures was a scholar named Shuhda, who was known as "the Pride of Women" during the twelfth century in Baghdad. Ulayya bint al-Mahdi was noted for her accomplishments in poetry and literature.

Al-Khayzuran, a former slave who eventually became the queen and wife of Caliph Al-Mahdi, was the first woman in Islamic history to have her own court, and to appear on currency. She also oversaw businesses that reported directly to her, ordered the building of wells and created of drinking fountains in Mecca and along pilgrimage routes.[3] Her daughter-in-law Zubaidah bint Ja'far also contributed to the creation of wells and reservoirs, and with her husband, contributed much of her wealth toward the construction of a pilgrimage trail known as the Zubaydah Trail in her honor.[4] However, in this era, it was also common for upper-class men to own women as concubines,[5] in a part of the Abbasid harem model. While images of harems have been depicted as "a secluded space of free sexual license, pleasure and idleness," historians have noted that harems were varied in organization and operation. Although women in the harems were expected to engage in sexual relations, they were also often well-educated, independent, and wealthy with their own residences and staffs.[6] For example, a number of enslaved women (qiyan) were known for their wit and charm: "many of the well-known women of the time were slave girls who had been trained from childhood in music, dancing and poetry".[6]: 22 A story featured in One Thousand and One Nights involves Tawaddud, "a slave girl who was said to have been bought at great cost by Harun al-Rashid because she had passed her examinations by the most eminent scholars in astronomy, medicine, law, philosophy, music, history, Arabic grammar, literature, theology and chess".[7] In 1258, Baghdad was attacked and captured by the Mongols.[8] With the departure of the Mongols a succession of Persian rivalries followed until 1553, when the Ottoman Sultan Suleiman captured Baghdad and its provinces, which became parts of the Turkish empire. There is some debate over the degree to which this change in power impacted the status of women: Ingrams states that Turks "had inflexible rules concerning women", leading to a decline in the status of women.[6]: 25 In contrast, Beatrice Forbes Manz states that women were granted a relatively high and public position in Turkic and Mongol societies, and cites several women in the Turkic dynasties ruling Iraq who achieved political importance.[9]

Ottoman Iraq

Following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in the aftermath of World War I, Britain was given the Mandate for administering Iraq by the League of Nations and therefore a new era began in Iraq under British rule.[10] The Iraqi Revolt in 1920 included women who participated against British oppression.[11]

Kingdom of Iraq

In 1923, the Iraqi women's movement started with the founding of the Women's Awakening Club, and the first women's magazine, Layla, published by journalist Paulina Hassoun.[12] Majda al-Haidari, wife of Raouf al-Chadirchi, has sometimes been said to be the first woman in Baghdad to have appeared unveiled in the 1930s,[13] but the Communist Amina al-Rahal, sister of Husain al-Rahal, have also been named as the first unveiled role model in Baghdad.[14] In the 1930s and 1940s, female College students gradually started to appear unveiled,[13] and most upper- and middle class urban women in Iraq were said to be unveiled by 1963.[15] By 1932, Iraq was declared independent and in 1946 became a founding member of the United Nations. Instability dominated the region until 1968 when the Ba'ath Party took control over the President Al Bakr and Iraq began to enjoy a period of stability.[16] A breakthrough in the issue of women's suffrage came in 1958. During the Arab Union of Iraq-Jordan, the Iraqi Constitution was set, in March 1958, to be amended to include women's suffrage later that year, but the matter became moot when the monarchy was abolished in July that year.[17] An unnamed MP to the newspaper al-Hawadith that he could never run against a female candidate, since if he lost he would have lost to a woman, which would have been dishonorable, and if he won, he would only have won over a woman; he claimed many male MPs felt the same, and that voters would also feel dishonored by being represented and ruled by a woman.[17] The MP Tawfq al-Mukhtar commented to a reporter: "Friends, women's rights bother me a lot, and anybody who condemns or criticizes them gives me great pleasure"; he added that he would withdraw if he was put against a female candidate, and he was one of four MPs to vote against the proposed amendment of March 1958.[17]

Baathist regime

In Ba'athist Iraq (1968–2003), the Secular Socialist Baath Party women were officially stated to be equal to men, and urban women were normally unveiled.[18][19][20] In 1970, equal rights for women were enshrined in Iraq's Constitution, including the right to vote, run for political office, access education and own property.[21] Article 19 of the Iraqi Provisional Constitution of 1970 granted all Iraqi citizens equal before the law regardless of sex, blood, language, social origin or religion, and the state women's umbrella organization General Foundation of Iraqi Women (GFIW) of 1972 guaranteed women's full equal rights in the professional and educational sphere, prevented all discrimination and recognized women's political participation in principle.[22] However, not all woman saw the same benefit from the progressive legislation for woman under the Ba'espite regime.

In "Iraqi Women and Gender Relations: Redefining Difference" by Nadje Al-Ali (2008) states "Despite the far-reaching powers of the centralized state, some women benefited more than others. For women in the countryside or women of low-income background, Saddam Hussein's speeches about women's emancipation and the passing of new more women-friendly laws and policies did not change prevailing gender norms, roles and expected behaviour"[23] Saddam Hussein succeeded Al Bakr as president in 1979. In 1980 full suffrage was granted and women were given the right to vote and be elected to political office.[24][25] The suffrage reform was granted when the new Iraq National Assembly was formed before the 1980s Elections, and 16 of 250 seats were filled by women.[26] After the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003, there was a surge in threats and harassment of unveiled women, and the use of hijab became common in Iraq.[27]

Education

Further information: Education in Iraq Iraq established an education system in 1921 and by the 1970s education became public and free at all levels.[28] Despite education being free until 1970, women had lower literacy rates than men on average.[29] Girls possessed low literacy rates because there were not enough schools to instruct them even though the Iraqi government made education mandatory for everyone.[29] Furthermore, women were required to have completed a basic education to vote in 1957.[29] A census conducted during this time showed that approximately one percent of women could legally vote.[29] This highlights a large disparity in not only women who are educated, but those who are able to vote.

During the 1970s and 1980s, despite Saddam Hussein attempting to use higher education as a form of propaganda, the overall illiteracy rate dropped until the Iran-Iraq War.[30] The progression of women's education has been hampered by the Iran-Iraq War, Gulf War, and the 2003 Iraq War. Throughout these wars, there have been several authoritarian leaders whose government policies negatively affected those in higher education. One those changes in regards to government policy is the severe lack of government funding to those in universities following the costly Iran-Iraq War. Government spending dropped from $620 before the Iran-Iraq War to $47; This decline happened slowly over time as Iraq as a country was suffering from economic challenges and put its budget elsewhere.[31] Consequently, this caused the enrollment rate to drop by 10% and the dropout rate by 20%, of which 31% were females compared to that of 18% of males; There were less women with upper-level jobs since they could not afford them in the first place.[31] Iraqi girls at school Women's overall literacy rate continued to decline well after the Iran-Iraq War, moreover this decline was more pronounced in the Southern rural provinces where obtaining an education was already difficult to begin with.[32] Overall attendance during the Iraq War was 68% amongst young girls compared to 82% of young boys, while girls in rural areas had a mere 25% attendance rate.[33][32] The wars forced women to work in agriculture rather than pursue a degree as necessary items such as food and water started to become more scarce and expensive.[30] Violence against women, such as rape, became more commonplace during the war period and was another reason as to why women did not pursue education.[30] Wartime violence was less pronounced in the Northern provinces of Iraq since less conflicts occurred in the region, which was under influence by Kurdish leaders.[33] During the Gulf War, the economic situation became so dire that women could not afford transportation fares to go to school in the first place.[30] Furthermore, some of the universities that did operate required women to wear the hijab; Those who didn't were subject to discrimination or sexual harassment by their male peers.[34] These students had to end their education abruptly and take care of their children instead.[30] Outside of wartime violence, there was a common perception that marriage provided better economic security for women than attending school.[33] The reliance on early marriages and the stress and grief caused by the wars on women left them incapable of making positive changes in the country via a political position.[33] Furthermore, the many years of education that women lost because of the wars created more wage and gender inequality for many years to come.[33] The gender gap with regard to Iraq's literacy rate is narrowing. Overall, 26% of Iraqi women are illiterate, and 11% of Iraqi men. For youth aged 15–24 years, the literacy rate is 80% for young women, and 85% for young men.[35] Girls are less likely than boys to continue their education beyond the primary level, and their enrollment numbers drop sharply after that. Education levels attained by Iraqi women and men in 2007 were:[36] Level of education Female (%) Male (%) Total (%) Primary 28.2 30.2 29.2 Secondary 9.6 13.7 11.6 Preparatory (upper secondary) 5.0 8.9 6.9 Diploma 3.8 5.4 4.6 Higher 3.1 5.6 4.4

Women's rights

On International Women's Day, 8 March 2011, a coalition of 17 Iraqi women's rights groups formed the National Network to Combat Violence Against Women in Iraq.[37] Yanar Mohammed at the Die Linke conference in Berlin in 2013 The Organization of Women's Freedom in Iraq (OWFI) is another Non-governmental organization committed to the defense of women's rights in Iraq. It has been very active in Iraq for several years, with thousands of members, and it is the Iraqi women's rights organization with the largest international profile. It was founded in June 2003 by Yanar Mohammed, Nasik Ahmad and Nadia Mahmood. It defends full social equality between women and men and secularism, and fights against Islamic fundamentalism and the American occupation of Iraq. Its president is Yanar Mohammed.

After the 2003 invasion, the government tried to remove the Personal Law Code, which is the basis for women's legal rights in Iraq. However feminist mobilization blocked this attempt and the law was reinstalled.[38] OWFI originated with the Organisation indépendante des femmes, active in Kurdistan from 1992 to 2003 despite government and religious oppression, and the Coalition de défense des droits des femmes irakiennes, founded in 1998 by Iraqi women in exile. OWFI concentrates its activities on the fight against sharia law, against abduction and murder of women and against honour killings. Thousands of members strong, it has at its disposal a network of support from outside Iraq, notably from the United States. It also has members in Great Britain, Canada, Sweden, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Norway, Finland, and Denmark. Its activists and its directors have many times been the object of death threats from Islamic organizations.

The circumstances resulting from the Gulf War and then the 1991 Iraqi uprisings, gave the Kurdish region of Iraq an essentially autonomous situation for a period, despite the conflicts between zones controlled by the largest nationalist parties. This allowed the development of some claims to women's rights, which in turn influenced some of the women who would become active in founding OWFI. During this period, Kurdish women activists began to demand legal reforms, better education, and protection from violence, laying the groundwork for future national movements.[39] OWFI's efforts have been recognized globally. In 2014, the organization received the Rafto prize for Human Rights for its effort to protect women's rights in a war-torn society.[40] This recognition has helped OWFI to secure funding and support from international NGOs and human rights groups, enabling it to expand its programs and services.

The founding statement of OWFI contains a mandate in six points:

To put in place a humanist law founded on equality and the assurance of the greatest freedom for women, and to abolish all forms of discriminatory laws;

To separate religion from the government and education;

To put an end to all forms of violence against women and honour killings, and to push for punishment for the murderers of women;

To abolish mandatory wearing of veils, the veil for children and to protect freedom of dress;

To put in place the equal participation of women and men in all social, economic, administrative and political spheres, at every level;

To abolish gender segregation in schools at all levels. [41] Some militant women's rights advocates in Iraq, who seek to establish a dialogue with Islamist women, maintain a distance from the radical feminism and secularism of OWFI.[42]

Women's rights in Iraqi Kurdistan

Some reported issues related to women in Kurdish society include genital mutilation,[43] honor killings,[44] domestic violence,[45] female infanticide[45] and polygamy.[46] Majority of reports have come from Iraq where the Kurdish and Iraqi population have been poorly educated and illiteracy is still a big problem among citizens. However, some reported issues have not been taken seriously, because all reported issues are common among the populations with whom they live.

Kurdish women carrying bread home from the souk, Dohuk, Iraqi Kurdistan Some Kurds in small populated areas, especially uneducated Kurds are organized in patrilineal clans, there is patriarchal control of marriage and property, women are generally treated in many ways like property.[47][48] Rural Kurdish women are often barred from making their own decisions regarding sexuality or husbands. Arranged marriages, and in some places child marriages, are common.[47][48][49] [page needed] Some Kurdish men, especially religious Kurds, also practice polygamy.[49] [page needed] However, polygamy has almost disappeared from Kurdish culture, [citation needed] especially in Syria after Rojava made it illegal. Some Kurdish women from uneducated, religious and poor families who took their own decisions with marriage or had affairs have become victims of violence, including beatings, honor killings and in extreme cases pouring acid on faces (very rare) (Kurdish Women's Rights Watch 2007).[48][49] [page needed][50] Kurds generally see having large families as the ideal.[47] Women's rights activists have said that after the elections in 1992, only five of the 105 elected members of parliament were women, and that women's initiatives were even actively opposed by Kurdish male politicians.[51] Women's rights activist Tanya Gilly Khailany, who was a member of the Iraqi Parliament between 2006 – 2010, pushed for the legislation of 25 per cent quota for women in Iraqi provincial councils.[52] Honor killings and other forms of violence against women have increased since the creation of Iraqi Kurdistan, and "both the KDP and PUK claimed that women's oppression, including 'honor killings', are part of Kurdish 'tribal and Islamic culture'".[51] New laws against honor killing and polygamy were introduced in Iraqi Kurdistan, however it was noted by Amnesty International that the prosecution of honor killings remains low, and the implementation of the anti-polygamy resolution (in the PUK-controlled areas) has not been consistent.[51] On the other hand, women rights activists also had some successes in Iraqi Kurdistan, and it was claimed that "the rise of conservative nationalist forces and the women's movement are two sides of the same coin of Kurdish nationalism."[51] Scholars like Mojab (1996) and Amir Hassanpour (2001) have argued that the patriarchal system in Kurdish regions has been as strong as in other Middle Eastern regions.[49]: 227 [53][54] In 1996, Mojab claimed that the Iraqi Kurdish nationalist movement "discourages any manifestation of womanhood or political demands for gender equality."[53][55][56][57] In 2001, Persian researcher Amir Hassanpour claimed that "linguistic, discursive, and symbolic violence against women is ubiquitous" in the Kurdish language, matched by various forms of physical and emotional violence.[49] [page needed][55] In 2005, Marjorie P. Lasky from CODEPINK claimed that since the PUK and KDP parties took power in Northern Iraq 1991, "hundreds of women were murdered in honor killings for not wearing hijab and girls could not attend school", and both parties have "continued attempts to suppress the women's organizations". Marjorie P. Lasky also said that U.S. military personnel have committed crimes of sexual abuse and physical assault against women and they are one of the reasons why women rights have worsened in Iraq.[58] The honor killing and self-immolation condoned or tolerated by the Kurdish administration in Iraqi Kurdistan has been labeled as "gendercide" by Mojab (2003).[51][59] Lasky concluded: "More widely reported are the Iraqi Kurdish nationalist parties' "disregard of women's issues and their attempts to suppress women's organizations".[55]

Women's suffrage

Full women's suffrage was introduced in Iraq in 1980. The campaign for women's suffrage started in the 1920s. The women's movement in Iraq organized in 1923 with the Nahda al-Nisa (Women's Awakening Club), led by Asma al-Zahawi and with elite women such as Naima a-Said, and Fakhriyya al-Askari among their members.[60] King Faysal himself had supported women's suffrage during his prior short tenure as king in Syria. Feminists such as Mary Wazir and Paulina Hasun raised the issue in the 1920s.[60] Paulina Hassan published the first Iraqi women's magazine, Layla, in 1923–1925, followed by a number of women's magazines in the 1930s and 1940s that voiced feminist demands.[61] When the Constituent Assembly of Iraq was inaugurated in 1924, Paulina Hassun appealed to the Assembly that women should not be excluded from political participation in the new nation, and one of the members, Amjad al-Umari, unsuccessfully proposed that the word "male" be erased from the Electoral Law to include women in it.[17] The Women's suffrage reform was primarily supported by the opposition parties, notably the Iraq Communist Party.[62] During the 1930s, the Communist ICP and the leftist al-Ahali supported women's suffrage.[17] Even those supporting the reform, however, often did so with the reservation that woman should reach a higher level of education before they were ready for it.[62] The Iraqi monarchy prioritized foreign policy rather than internal issues and showed little enthusiasm to address the issue of women's suffrage.[63] The monarchy was careful to avoid alienating conservative and religious circles, who considered women's suffrage as incompatible with the "nature" of women, the proper social order and gender hierarchies, and women's suffrage was not given refused serious consideration.[17] Both the Sunni and Shia clergy rejected women's suffrage as being in opposition to the natural roles of gender, as the "joke of the day", an attack on the law of nature and the proper way of life, since women were the weaker sex and "lesser persons" similar to children.[17] When women's suffrage in Syria was introduced in 1949, MP Farhan al-Irs of al-Amara commented: "Women are shameful. How could they possibly sit with men?"[17] In 1951 a motion to include women in the Electoral Law was rejected in the Chamber of Deputies.[17] During the discussion to change the electoral law to include women's suffrage in March–April 1951, the MP Abd al-Abbas of Diwaniyya opposed suffrage as this would contradict Islamic sex segregation, as elected women MP would then sit among male MPs in the Chamber of Deputies: "Is this not forbidden? Are we not all of Islam?"[17] An electoral decree in December 1952 provided direct elections but did not include women.[17] A Sunni scholar published an article in the paper al-Sijill in October 1952 named "The Crime of Equality Between Men and Women": as an imam and khatib of the mosques of Baghdad and scholar of the al-Azhar University, he stated that women's suffrage was a plot against Islam and contrary to Quranic verses which delineated gender hierarchies that made women in politics incompatible.[17] A number of women's organization was founded in the 1940s and 1950s that campaigned for women's rights including suffrage, notably the Iraqi Union for Women's Rights (1952).[62] Naziha al-Dulaimi of the League for Defence of Women's Rights (Iraqi Women's League), which gathered 42,000 members, campaigned for gender equality (including suffrage), organized educational programs, provided social services, established 78 literacy centers, and drafted the 1959 Personal Status Law, which was accepted and introduced by the Government.[64] In the 1950s the Iraqi Women's Union petitioned senior state figures including the prime minister and wrote articles in the press.[17] A Week of Women's Rights was launched in October 1953 by Iraqi Women's Union suffrage, who arranged a sumposium and voiced their demand in radio programs and articles in the press to campaigned for women's suffrage.[17] As a response, the Islamic clergy launched a Week of Virtue and called for a general strike against women's suffrage and called for women to "stay at home" since women's suffrage was against Islam.[17] During the Week of Virtue, the Sunni Nihal al-Zahawi, daughter of Amjad al-Zahawi, head of the Muslim Sisters Society (Jamiyyat al-Aukht al-Muslima), spoke on the radio against women's suffrage: she described the suffragists as women who revolted against the very Islam that gave them rights, and that women's suffrage was lamentable since it broke sex segregation and resulted in gender mixing, which was an unrestricted liberty that broke the rules of against Islam.[17] A breakthrough came in 1958. During the Arab Union of Iraq-Jordan, the Iraqi Constitution was set, in March 1958, to be amended to include women's suffrage later that year, but the matter became moot when the monarchy was abolished in July that year.[17] An unnamed MP to the newspaper al-Hawadith that he could never run against a female candidate, since if he lost he would have lost to a woman, which would have been disonorable, and if he won, he would only have won over a woman; he claimed many male MPs felt the same, and that voters would also feel dishonored by being represented and ruled by a woman.[17] The MP Tawfq al-Mukhtar commented to a reporter: "Friends, women's rights bother me a lot, and anybody who condemns or criticizes them gives me great pleasure"; he added that he would withdraw if he was put against a female candidate, and he was one of four MPs to vote against the proposed amendment of March 1958.[17] In 1958 the Iraqi Monarchy was replaced by the Baathis regime. The early Baathist regime saw women's emancipation in many aspects, with urban liberal modernist women enjoying professional and educational equality and appearing unveiled.[65] The Baathist Party supported women's rights by principle, though it initially focused in expanding women's educational and professional rights rather than their political rights.[60] Article 19 of the Iraqi Provisional Constitution of 1970 granted all Iraqi citizens equal before the law regardless of sex, blood, language, social origin or religion, and the state women's umbrella organization General Foundation of Iraqi Women (GFIW) of 1972 guaranteed women's full equal rights in the professional and educational sphere, prevented all discrimination and recognized women's political participation in principle.[22] However, while women's rights progressed in other aspects, the political rights was delayed. The regime was unstable and saw four regime changes in the 1960s.[65] In 1980 full suffrage was granted and women were given the right to vote and be elected to political office.[24][25] The suffrage reform was granted when the new Iraq National Assembly was formed before the 1980s Elections, and 16 of 250 seats where filled by women.[26]

Marriage

By law, a woman has to be eighteen years or older to get married. Marriage and family are necessities for economic needs, social control and mutual protection within the family. During the Ba'athist regime, marriage was used under the regime during the Iraq-Iran war to discourage Iraqi woman from marrying Iranian men.[23] "Iraqi Women and Gender Relations: Redefining Difference" by Nadje Al-Ali (2008) "During the Iran-Iraq war, a series of legal decrees were introduced to control women's marital and reproductive freedoms. In December 1982, the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) issued a decree forbidding Iraqi women to marry non-Iraqis as well as another decree prohibiting Iraqi women married to non-Iraqis to transfer money or property to their husbands as inheritance."[23] Divorce is a very common practice in Iraq.[66]

Legal system

The Iraqi Constitution of 2005 states that Islam is the main source of legislation and laws must not contradict Islamic provisions. The family law is discriminatory towards women, particularly with regard to divorce, child custody, and inheritance. In a court of law, a woman's testimony is worth in some cases half of that of a man, and in some cases it is equal.[67]

Sharia law

See also: Sharia and Islamic State of Iraq Islam is the official religion of Iraq with about 97% of the population practice this religion.[68] On January 29, 2004, the interim Iraqi government, supported by the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq and despite the strong opposition of the American Administrator Paul Bremer, launched Resolution 137 which introduced sharia law in the "law on personal civil status", which since 1958 established rights and freedoms for Iraqi women. This resolution permitted very different interpretations from the law of 1958 on the part of religious communities. It opened an additional breach in the civil law and risked exacerbating inter-religious tensions in Iraq.[69] In a statement, OWFI affirmed: Iraq is a secular society. Women and men in Iraq never imagined that they would defeat Ba'athist Fascism only to have it replaced with an Islamic dictatorship.[75] Despite its reputation for being relatively secular, sharia law was never totally absent from Iraq before 2003. The "law on personal civil status" provided that, in the case that it was not expressly forbidden in the law, it would be sharia law that would prevail.[70] A coalition of 85 women's organizations, through means of international communication, launched a protest movement.[70] One month later, on January 29, 2004, the resolution was withdrawn.[71] Beginning in September 2004, OWFI launched a new campaign against the forced wearing of the veil being enforced by Islamic militias, notably in the universities.[72] In 2005, there was once again debate over the new constitution, which considered Islam as one of the sources of Iraqi law. Yanar Mohammed wrote:[73] The outline of the constitution proposes, in article 14, the repeal of existing law and to refer merely to family law, in concordance with Islamic sharia law and other religious codes in Iraq. In other words, it makes women vulnerable to all forms of inequality and social discrimination. and makes them second class citizens, lesser human beings For the same reasons, OWFI denounced the 2005 elections, dominated by parties hostile to women's rights.[74] Women's groups also denounce "pleasure marriages", based on a practise commonly believed to be founded on Islamic law, which was revived during the occupation of Iraq: it authorizes a man to marry a woman, through a money gift, for a determined period of time. In most cases, groups such as OWFI charge, it provides a legal cover for prostitution.[75]

Crimes against women

Female genital mutilation

Further information: Female genital mutilation Prevalence of female genital mutilation in Iraq for women aged 15–49 using UNICEF "Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting, 2013, from [1]. There is a more recent 2016 survey here: [2]. Green = Less than 3%, Blue = 15–25%, Red = Above 50%. The highest prevalence rates of FGM are in Kirkuk (20%), Sulaymaniyah (54%) and Erbil (58%). Female genital mutilation (FGM) was an accepted part of Sorani speaking Kurdish culture in Iraq, including Erbil and Sulaymaniyah.[76] A 2011 Kurdish law criminalized FGM practice in Iraqi Kurdistan and law was accepted four years later.[45][77][78] MICS reported in 2011 that in Iraq, FGM was found mostly among the Kurdish areas in Erbil, Sulaymaniyah and Kirkuk, giving the country a national prevalence of eight percent. However, other Kurdish areas like Dohuk and some parts of Ninewa were almost free from FGM.[79][80] In 2014, a small survey of 827 households conducted in Erbil and Sulaymaniyah assessed a 58.5% prevalence of FGM in both cities. According to the same survey, FGM has declined in recent years.[80][81][82] In 2016, the studies showed that there is a trend of general decline of FGM among those who practiced it before. Kurdish human rights organizations have reported several times that FGM is not a part of Kurdish culture and authorities aren't doing enough to stop it completely.[83] According to a 2008 report in The Washington Post, the Kurdistan region of Iraq is one of the few places in the world where female genital mutilation had been rampant.[84] According to one study carried out in 2008, approximately 60% of all women in Kurdish areas of northern Iraq had been mutilated.[84] It was claimed that at least one Kurdish territory, female genital mutilation had occurred among 95% of women.[84] The Kurdistan Region has strengthened its laws regarding violence against women in general and female genital mutilation in particular,[45] and is now considered to be an anti-FGM model for other countries to follow.[85] Female genital mutilation was prevalent in Iraqi Kurdistan. In 2010, WADI published a study that 72% of all Kurdish women and girl were circumcised that year. Two years later, a similar study was conducted in the province of Kirkuk with findings of 38% FGM prevalence giving evidence to the assumption that FGM was not only practiced by the Kurdish population but also existed in central Iraq. According to the research, FGM is most common among Sunni Muslims, but is also practiced by Shi'ites and Kakeys, while Christians and Yezidi don't seem to practice it in northern Iraq.[86] In Erbil Governorate and Suleymaniya Type I FGM was common; while in Garmyan and New Kirkuk, Type II and III FGM were common.[87][88] There was no law against FGM in Iraq, but in 2007 a draft legislation condemning the practice was submitted to the Regional Parliament, but was not passed.[89] A field report by Iraqi group PANA Center, published in 2012, shows 38% of women in Kirkuk and its surrounding districts areas had undergone female circumcision. Of those circumcised, 65% were Kurds, 26% Arabs and rest Turkmen. On the level of religious and sectarian affiliation, 41% were Sunnis, 23% Shiites, rest Kaka'is, and none Christians or Chaldeans.[90] A 2013 report finds FGM prevalence rate of 59% based on clinical examination of about 2000 Iraqi Kurdish women; FGM found were Type I, and 60% of the mutilation were performed to girls in 4–7 year age group.[80] Female genital mutilation is prevalent in Iraqi Kurdistan, with an FGM rate of 72% according to the 2010 WADI report[86] for the entire region and exceeding 80% in Garmyan and New Kirkuk. In Erbil Governorate and Suleymaniya Type I FGM is common; while in Garmyan and New Kirkuk, Type II and III FGM are common.[87][88] There was no law against FGM in Iraqi Kurdistan, but in 2007 a draft legislation condemning the practice was submitted to the Regional Parliament, but was not passed.[89] A 2011 Kurdish law criminalized FGM practice in Iraqi Kurdistan,[91] however this law is not being enforced.[78] A field report by Iraqi group PANA Center, published in 2012, shows 38% of women in Kirkuk and its surrounding districts areas had undergone female circumcision. Of those circumcised, 65% were Kurds, 26% Arabs and rest Turkmen. On the level of religious and sectarian affiliation, 41% were Sunnis, 23% Shiites, rest Kaka'is, and none Christians or Chaldeans.[90] A 2013 report finds FGM prevalence rate of 59% based on clinical examination of about 2000 Iraqi Kurdish women; FGM found were Type I, and 60% of the mutilation were performed to girls in 4–7 year age group.[80]

Honour crimes

In 1990, during Saddam Hussein's regime following the First Gulf War he made a presidential decree that cited, granting immunity for any man that had committed honor killings.[23] In 2008 the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) has stated that honor killings are a serious concern in Iraq, particularly in Iraqi Kurdistan.[92] The Free Women's Organization of Kurdistan (FWOK) released a statement on International Women's Day 2015 noting that "6,082 women were killed or forced to commit suicide during the past year in Iraqi Kurdistan, which is almost equal to the number of the Peshmerga martyred fighting Islamic State (IS)," and that a large number of women were victims of honor killings or enforced suicide – mostly self-immolation or hanging.[93] About 500 honour killings per year are reported in hospitals in Iraqi Kurdistan, although real numbers are likely much higher.[94] It is speculated that alone in Erbil there is one honour killing per day.[95] The UNAMI reported that at least 534 honour killings occurred between January and April 2006 in the Kurdish Governorates.[96][97] It is claimed that many deaths are reported as "female suicides" in order to conceal honour-related crimes.[96][98] Aso Kamal of the Doaa Network Against Violence claimed that they have estimated that there were more than 12,000 honor killings in Iraqi Kurdistan from 1991 to 2007. He also said that the government figures are much lower, and show a decline in recent years, and Kurdish law has mandated since 2008 that an honor killing be treated like any other murder.[99] Attitudes towards domestic violence are ambivalent even among women. A UNICEF survey of adolescent girls aged 15–19, covering the years 2002–2009, asked them if they think that a husband is justified in hitting or beating his wife under certain circumstances; 57% responded yes.[35] Under the Criminal Code of Iraq, honor killings can only be punished with a maximum of three years. According to paragraph 409 "Any person who surprises his wife in the act of adultery or finds his girlfriend in bed with her lover and kills them immediately or one of them or assaults one of them so that he or she dies or is left permanently disabled is punishable by a period of detention not exceeding 3 years. It is not permissible to exercise the right of legal defence against any person who uses this excuse nor do the rules of aggravating circumstance apply against him".[100] In addition to this, a husband also has a legal right to "punish" his wife: paragraph 41 states that there is no crime if an act is committed while exercising a legal right. Examples of legal rights include: "The punishment of a wife by her husband, the disciplining by parents and teachers of children under their authority within certain limits prescribed by law or by custom".[100] Information supplied by OWFI on the resurgence of honour crimes since 2003 was included in the September 2006 report by the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI).[101]

Shelters

OWFI created shelters in Baghdad, Kirkuk, Erbil and Nassiriya for women and couples whose families have threatened them with honour crimes.[102] The location of shelters was kept secret and they were under permanent guard. A crisis phone line number was available in each issue of 'al-Moussawat. An "underground railroad" was put in place, with the help of the American association Madre, to allow some women to clandestinely escape the country.[102] Several other organizations from abroad assisted this initiative.[72][103][104] Since the end of 2007, the shelters, determined to be too dangerous for the residents, were closed and many of the women were accommodated in host families. The operation costs OWFI around $60,000 per year.[105]

Forced prostitution, abductions and killings of women

See also: Prostitution in Iraq Beginning in August 2003, OWFI organized a protest to attract attention to the rapid growth in rapes and abductions.[72] A letter sent by OWFI to Paul Bremer, in charge of the American administration in Iraq, on the question of violence against women, remained unanswered.[106] An inquiry was initiated by OWFI to examine abductions and killings of women. Yanar Mohammed comes to the following conclusion: According to our estimates, no fewer than 30 women were executed by the militias in Baghdad and in the suburbs. During the first ten days of November 2007, more than 150 unclaimed women's corpses, most of them decapitated, mutilated, or having evidence of extreme torture, were processed through the Bagdad morgue.[108] For OWFI, these deaths are linked to honour crimes,[107] but in this case, in a new form, since the killings are taken beyond the family circle to become the business of paramilitary groups.

Beginning in 2006, OWFI initiated an inquiry into the link between widespread abductions of women and prostitution networks. Activists for women's rights in Iraq have mapped and studied prostitution in their country to understand how it functions and how trafficking spreads, showing that the majority of prostitutes are minors and that the trafficking networks extend throughout the Middle East. This campaign of enquiry, publicized by an interview on the channel MBC in May 2009, was denounced by the pro-government channel Al-Iraqia, which held that it constituted a "humiliation for Iraqi women".[108] Indeed, shortly before his resignation, Minister of Women's Affairs Nawal al-Samarraie had declared that the traffic in prostitution was limited and that the young women were involved voluntarily, which Yanar Mohammed had denounced.[109] The Iraqi Kurdistan region has reportedly received "women and children trafficked from the rest of Iraq for prostitution".[110] Criminal gangs have prostituted girls from outside of the Iraqi Kurdistan Region in the provinces of Erbil, Dahuk, and Sulaymaniyah.[111] NGOs have alleged that some personnel from the Kurdistan Regional Government's Asayish internal security forces have facilitated prostitution in Syrian refugee camps in Iraqi Kurdistan.[112] Iraqi women were sold into "temporary marriages" and Syrian girls from refugee camps in Iraqi Kurdistan were forced into early or "temporary marriages", and it was alleged that KRG authorities ignored such cases.[112][113] On October 2, 2020, a UN special rapporteur urged the Iraqi authorities to investigate the murder of a woman human rights defender, and the attempted killing of another, targeted "simply because they are women".[114]

Abuse of women since the 2003 invasion

The aftermath of the 2003 invasion of Iraq came with an increase of oppression against women. Based on a 2008 survey done by the Women for Women International, the survey showed that 63.9 percent of the Iraqi women had stated that "violence against women in general was increasing."[115] Yanar Mohammed, an Iraqi feminist, "asserts unequivocally that war and occupation have cost Iraqi women their legal standing and their everyday freedom of dress and movement".[116] She continues by arguing that "The first losers in all these were women".[122] Arising from their fear of being raped and harassed, women have to wear not only the veil, but must also to wear chador in order not to attract attention. In an online edition of The Guardian, Mark Lattiner reports that despite promises and hopes given to the Iraqi population that their lives were going to improve, Iraqi women's lives "have become immeasurably worse, with rapes, burnings and murders [now] as a daily occurrence."[117]

Yazidi women

The invasion by the Islamic State from 2014 to 2017 further exacerbated gender violence and discrimination against women in Iraq, limiting women's movement and opportunities. The Yazidi women have been severely affected by ISIS conflicts and the Yazidi genocide in 2014. The Yazidis, a Kurdish minority, in northern Iraq and western Kurdistan have beceome victims of ISIS violence. The rise of ISIS in 2014 led to human rights violations, including a 2014 attack on Mount Sinjar that resulted in about 3,100 deaths and 6,800 abductions.[118] Women and girls were targeted for abduction and sexual violence. Approximately 300,000 Yazidis have been displaced in Kurdistan, mainly in refugee camps, with many still missing. Displaced Yazidis suffer from high levels of physical and mental health issues, with women experiencing especially high rates of trauma, PTSD, and depression due to war-related and gender-based violence.[118]

Women's prisons

OWFI has set up an observation group of activists, directed by Dalal Jumaa, which focuses its action on the defense of the rights of women in prison and in police detention. It has notably obtained authorization to regularly visit the Khadidimya prison, in Baghdad, and to denounce the detention conditions: rapes during interrogations, poor treatment, and the presence of children in the cells. OWFI has taken part in negotiations with the municipality of Bagdad to open a daycare in proximity to the prison.[119] In 2009, OWFI was alerted to the situation of 11 women condemned to death, detained in this prison, after the execution of one among them.[120] In 2010, OWFI observers met young girls aged 12 years, expelled from Saudi Arabia for prostitution and imprisoned in Iraq.[108] In February 2014 Human Rights Watch released a 105-page report 'No One is Safe' alleging there are thousands of Iraqi women in jails being held without charge, that are being routinely tortured, beaten, and raped.[121]

1990 Iraq Sanctions

The United Nations implementation of strict economic sanctions on trade to and from on Iraq in 1990, following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, impacted women's lives in Iraq more than men.[122] The gendered impact of the international sanctions on Iraq in 1990 significantly increased the challenges faced by women in all fields. In the labor market, sanctions severely restricted economic prospects. This led to a dramatic decline in women's labor participation and employment. Women's positions and jobs were undermined in the labor market, which provided stable employment for many Iraqi women in the 1970s and 1980s, as the public sector deteriorated, resulting in lost opportunities and reduced incentives for female workers, forcing them to stay at home and become dependant on their male family members or partners.[122] The sanctions also decimated Iraq's educational system, once was the best in the Middle East before the sanctions, causing a drop in female enrollment in primary, secondary and higher education levels and an increase in illiteracy among women. The quality of education worsened amid the sanctions due to the destruction of educational institutions and a severe shortage of resources, such as educational materials and teachers.[122] In addition, the psychological impact on women was immense as their domestic responsibilities increased. The combination of economic, educational, and psychological pressures hindered the progress and well-being of Iraqi women during this period.[122]

Women's workplace rights

In February 2004, OWFI launched a campaign to support fifty female bank employees held on charges of embezzling millions during exchange operations involving banknotes. Embarrassed by the affair, U.S. authorities freed them and their informant was arrested.[123] OWFI has denounced the Islamist-influenced licensing process for women in professions. Nuha Salim declared: The insurgents and militias do not want us in the professional sphere for various reasons: some because they believe women were born to stay at home – and cook and clean -- and others because they say that it is contrary to Islam that a man and woman should find themselves in the same place if they are not related.[130]

Women's social life

In a speech on April 17, 1971, vice-president Saddam Hussein proclaimed that:[124] Women make up one half of society. Our society will remain backward and in chains unless its women are liberated, enlightened and educated. Until the 1990s, Iraqi women played an active role in the political and economic development of Iraq.[125] In 1969, the Ba'ath Party established the General Federation of Iraqi Women, which offered many social programs to women, implementing legal reforms advancing women's status under the law and lobbying for changes to the personal status code.[125] In 1986, Iraq became one of the first countries to ratify the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women.[125] During the 1970s and 1980s, Saddam Hussein urged women to fill men's places in schools, universities, hospitals, factories, the army, and the police. However, women's employment subsequently decreased as they were encouraged to make way for returning soldiers in the late 1980s and the 1990s.[126] In general in cases of war, as Nadje Sadig Al-Ali, author of Iraqi Women: Untold Stories from 1948 to the Present, argues, "women carried the conflicting double burden of being the main motors of the state bureaucracy and the public sector, the main breadwinners and heads of households but also the mothers of 'future soldiers.'[127]: 168 In the years following the 1991 Gulf War, many of the positive steps that had been taken to advance women's and girls' status in Iraqi society were reversed due to a combination of legal, economic, and political factors.[125] As the economy constricted due to sanctions, women were pushed into more traditional roles.[125] Moreover, Saddam Hussein, in an attempt to maintain legitimacy with conservative Islamic fundamentalists, brought in anti-woman legislation, such as the 1990 presidential decree granting immunity to men who had committed honour crimes.[134]: 202 However, despite Saddam's appeals to the anti-women elements of Iraqi society, according to local NGOs, they concluded that "women were treated better during the Saddam Hussein era and their rights were more respected than they are now."[128] As noted by Yasmin Husein, author of Women in Iraq, the traditional role of women in Iraq is confined mainly to domestic responsibilities and nurturing the family. The wide scale destruction of Iraq's infrastructure (i.e., sanitation, water supply and electricity) as a result of war and sanctions, worsened women's situation. Women, in the process, assumed extra burdens and domestic responsibilities in society, as opposed to their male counterparts.[129]

Hijab and choice of clothing

In the 1920s, when the Iraqi women's movement begun under the Women's Awakening Club, the opposing conservatives accused it of wanting to unveil women.[130] Majda al-Haidari, wife of Raouf al-Chadirchi, has sometimes been said to be the first woman in Baghdad to have appeared unveiled in the 1930s,[13] but the Communist Amina al-Rahal, sister of Husain al-Rahal, have also been named as the first unveiled role model in Baghdad.[14] In the 1930s and 1940s, female College students gradually started to appear unveiled,[13] and most upper- and middle class urban women in Iraq were said to be unveiled by 1963.[15] In early Ba'athist Iraq (1968–1979), the Secular Socialist Baath Party women were officially stated to be equal to men, and urban women were normally unveiled.[18][131][20] In Ba'athist Iraq (1968–2003), the Secular Socialist Baath Party officially stated women to be equal to men, and urban women were normally unveiled.[18][131][20] After the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003, there was a surge in threats and harassment of unveiled women, and the use of hijab became common in Iraq.[27] In 2017, the Iraqi army imposed a burqa ban in the liberated areas of Mosul for the month of Ramadan. Police stated that the temporary ban was for security measures, so that ISIS bombers could not disguise themselves as women.[132]

Women in the 2019 Iraq Protests

As Zahra Ali said in an interview on transnational feminism in Iraq, the 2019 Iraq protest were primarily organized by young people. Women were included and played a big role in organizing and voicing their protest.[133] Women from all classes, ages, religious affiliations and educational backgrounds participated in the protests, through debating, protesting, organizing or cooking for the protestors. Women-led grassroots movement, such as the Organization of Women's Freedom in Iraq and the Iraqi Women Network, which emerged after the 2003 invasion, have included demands for justice of social and political issues during the protests and during other actions, amongst pre-existing challenges.[134] Repression by the government during the protest were in many forms by undermining the uprising with fear tactics which targeted women specifically. Their presence in the demonstrations were considered subversive but one of their many chants were "Do not say it's shameful! A woman's voice is Revolution!"[135]

Women in the government and military

See also: Federal government of Iraq and Iraqi Armed Forces The Iraqi Constitution states that a quarter of the government must be made up of women. In the 1950s Iraq became the first Arab country to have a female minister and to have a law that gave women the ability to ask for divorces.[136] Women attained the right to vote and run for public office in 1980. Under Saddam Hussein, women in government got a year's maternity leave.[137] There is also a large divide among the women themselves, some more modern women wanting a larger percent of women in the Iraqi government still, and some more traditional women believing that they and others are not qualified enough to hold any sort of position in the Iraqi government. Another existing issue is the increasing number of illiterate women in the country. In 1987 approximately 75 percent of Iraqi women were literate. In 2000, Iraq had the lowest regional adult literacy levels, with the percentage of literate women at less than 25 percent. This makes it increasingly difficult to put educated women in a position of power.[138] Although there are many issues with the current spread of power among genders in Iraq, they are one of the more westernized Arab countries. However, there is hope for women in Iraq. After Hussein's fall in 2003, women's leaders in Iraq saw it as a key opportunity to gain more power in Parliament. The leaders asked for a quota that would have seen that at least 40 percent of the Parliament to be women. In the 2010 National Elections, a group of twelve women started their own party based on women's issues, such as a jobs program for Iraq's 700,000 widows.[139] The United States' involvement in Iraq was seen as detrimental to women. Since Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki was elected as Prime Minister of Iraq, not one woman has been appointed to his senior cabinet.[140] In 2011, Ibtihal al-Zaidi was appointed Minister of State for Women's Affairs, but was strongly criticized after she made remarks declaring that women were not equal to men.[141] Constitutionally, women lost a number of key rights after the United States entered Iraq. The Family Statutes law, which guarantees women equal rights when it comes to marriage, divorce, inheritance, and custody, was replaced by one that gave power to religious leaders and allowed them to dictate family matters according to their interpretation of their chosen religious text.[140]

See also

Human rights in post-invasion Iraq

Human rights in post-invasion Iraq have been a subject of concern and controversy since the 2003 U.S. invasion. Issues have been raised regarding the conduct of insurgents, U.S.-led coalition forces, and the Iraqi government. The United States is investigating several allegations of violations of international and domestic standards of conduct in isolated incidents involving its forces and contractors. Similarly, the United Kingdom is conducting investigations into alleged human rights abuses by its forces. War crime tribunals and criminal prosecutions for numerous crimes committed by insurgents are likely still years away. In late February 2009, the U.S. State Department released a report on the human rights situation in Iraq, reflecting on developments during the previous year (2008).[1] Shops in Zakho after the 2011 Dohuk riots

Human rights abuses by insurgents

Main article: Iraq War insurgent attacks See also: List of suicide bombings in Iraq since 2003 and List of massacres of the Iraq War The UN headquarters building in Baghdad after the Canal Hotel bombing, on 22 August 2003 Human rights abuses carried out or alleged to have been carried out by Iraq-based insurgents and/or terrorists include:

August 2003

The bombing of the U.N. headquarters in Baghdad in August 2003 resulted in the death of the top U.N. representative in Iraq, 55-year-old Sérgio Vieira de Mello, a Brazilian diplomat who also served as the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights.[2] The attack claimed the lives of 22 U.N. staff members and injured more than 100 others. Among the dead was Nadia Younes, a former Executive Director at the World Health Organization (WHO) in charge of External Relations and Governing Bodies. The terrorist attack was strongly condemned by U.N.

Secretary-General Kofi Annan and denounced by the U.N. Security Council.[3]

June 2004

South Korean translator Kim Sun-il was beheaded by followers of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.[4]

July 2004

Tawhid and Jihad killed Bulgarian truck drivers Ivaylo Kepov and Georgi Lazov. Al-Jazeera aired a videotape of the incident but stated that the segment showing the actual killings was too graphic to broadcast.[5]

December 2004

Salvatore Santoro, a 52-year-old Italian photographer, was beheaded in a video. The Islamic Movement of Iraqi Mujahedeen claimed responsibility for the act.[4] An Iraqi vehicle burns in Baghdad after being hit by a mortar that was fired by insurgents, 8 August 2006

February 2005

Al-Iraqiya TV (Iraq) aired transcripts of confessions by Syrian intelligence officer Anas Ahmad Al-Issa and Iraqi terrorist Shihab Al-Sab'awi. The confessions detailed their involvement in booby-trap operations, explosions, kidnappings, assassinations, and training for beheadings in Syria.[6]

July 2005

Egyptian and Algerian envoys.

Two Algerian diplomats, Ali Belaroussi and Azzedine Belkadi, were reported to have been killed by al-Qaeda in Iraq. The group issued a statement online claiming responsibility, stating: “The court of al-Qaeda in Iraq has decided to carry out God’s verdict against the two diplomats from the apostate Algerian government ... and ordered to kill them.” The statement was signed by Abu Maysara al-Iraqi, the al-Qaeda spokesman.[7]

An Egyptian diplomat, Al-Sherif, was reported to have been killed by al-Qaeda in Iraq. The group posted a statement on a web forum claiming responsibility for the killing. Top Sunni cleric Mohamed Sayed Tantawi condemned the act, describing it as "a crime against religion, morality, and humanity, as well as a crime that goes against honor and chivalry."[8]

February 2006

The Al Askari Mosque bombing took place on February 22, 2006, at approximately 6:55 am local time (0355 UTC) at the Al Askari Mosque, one of the holiest sites in Shi'a Islam, in the Iraqi city of Samarra, about 100 km (62 mi) northwest of Baghdad. Although no injuries were reported from the blast itself, the bombing led to violence in the following days. On February 23, over 100 dead bodies with bullet holes were found, and at least 165[9] people are believed to have been killed.

June 2006

A video showing the killing of four Russian diplomats kidnapped in Iraq was posted on the Internet. The group called the Mujahideen Shura Council released the hostage video.[10] The Islamic State of Iraq captured and subsequently murdered three U.S. soldiers in May 2007

July 2006

Anba' Al-Iraq News Agency and the Writers Without Borders Organization condemned the imprisonment of its staff member, Husain E. Khadir, who was responsible for covering documentaries about the threats posed by the Kurdistan Federal Region to its neighboring countries. A delegation from Human Rights Watch (HRW) released reports on torture in Iraq, as well as the repression of human rights and freedom of expression. HRW interviewed several detained writers and journalists to document these violations. Mr. Khadir was first detained in Kirkuk and later moved to Erbil, where HRW visited him in one of the detention centers.

The previous year in Baghdad, Khadir faced even worse conditions when he escaped from a Shi'a militia that had seized his house and thrown his family into the streets, an act seen as a serious threat to his life. Such actions are commonly directed at human rights activists, journalists, and writers who criticize the Iraqi government and the Shi'a coalition party. During the constitution-writing process, several press and media agencies strongly criticized the Iraqi Shi'a Coalition. Khadir led a campaign to amend the constitution, advocating for a document that would serve as a peace-building tool, bringing all parties together for national consensus and social cohesion, rather than merely serving as a state-building instrument, as the ruling party frequently stated.

UNAMI commented that most of these civil society activities were supported by UN agencies, international donors, or the U.S. and British governments. The IRIN/UN news agency revealed that journalists and writers are among the most vulnerable victims of killing, threats, kidnapping, torture, and detention, practices commonly carried out by uncontrolled Iraqi forces, paramilitary organizations, and Shi'a or Sunni militias. This situation, similar to Khadir's case, is spreading across southern, central, and northern Iraq.[11] The number of journalists and writers killed in Iraq has exceeded 220 this year, according to the Iraqi Organization for Supporting Journalists, as reported to IRIN.[12] U.S. National Guard Sergeant Frank "Greg" Ford claimed to have witnessed human rights violations in Samarra, Iraq.

However, a subsequent Army investigation found Ford's allegations to be unfounded. Additionally, Ford was discovered to have worn unauthorized "U.S. Navy SEAL" insignia on his Army uniform, despite having never been a Navy SEAL, a claim he had made for many years while serving in the Army National Guard.

The Kuwaiti News Agency reported that a high-ranking Iraqi security source in the Interior Ministry confirmed the final death toll of the 13 August bombings in the Al-Zafaraniyah district in southern Baghdad was 57 killed and 145 injured, most of them women and children.[13] Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki blamed Sunni extremists for seeking to escalate the conflict.[14]

Human rights abuses by coalition forces

Abu Ghraib torture and prisoner abuse Gun camera footage of the airstrike of 12 July 2007 in Baghdad, showing the slaying of Namir Noor-Eldeen and a dozen other civilians by a US helicopter.

Prison and interrogation abuses by coalition forces

Main article: Iraq prison abuse scandal

April 2003

On April 29, 2003, an Iraqi man, Ather Karen al-Mowafakia, was shot and killed by a British soldier at a roadside checkpoint. Witnesses alleged that he was shot in the abdomen after the door of his car struck a soldier's leg as he was getting out of the vehicle. They further claimed he was then dragged from the car and beaten by the soldier's comrades, later succumbing to his injuries in the hospital. Despite seven attempts by The Guardian to address the incident, the UK Ministry of Defence (MOD) has refused to explain why the individuals were detained or provide details on where, how, or why they died.[15]

May 2003

In May 2003, Saeed Shabram and his cousin, Menem Akaili, were detained by British troops and thrown into a river near Basra. Akaili survived, but Shabram drowned. According to Akaili, the two were approached by a British patrol, led at gunpoint to a jetty, and forced into the water. The act, referred to as "wetting," was reportedly used to humiliate local youths suspected of looting. "Wetting was supposed to humiliate those suspected of being petty criminals," said Sapna Malik, the family's lawyer from Leigh Day and Co. "Although the Ministry of Defence (MOD) denies the existence of a policy of wetting to deal with suspected looters at the time, evidence we have seen suggests otherwise. The tactics employed by the MOD appeared to include throwing or placing suspected looters into either of Basra's two main waterways."

Iraqi bystanders rescued Akaili, but Shabram disappeared. His body was later recovered by a diver hired by his father, Radhi Shabram, after a four-hour search while his mother waited on the riverbank. "When Saeed's corpse was finally pulled from the river, Radhi described it as bloated and covered with marks and bruises," Malik added. Although the MOD paid compensation to Shabram's family, none of the soldiers involved were charged in connection with his death.[16] Ahmed Jabbar Kareem Ali, a 15-year-old boy, was on his way to work with his brother on May 8, 2003, when he was assaulted by a group of British soldiers. The soldiers beat him and then forced him into a canal at gunpoint to "teach him a lesson" for suspected looting. Weakened from the beating, Ali struggled in the water and drowned. His lifeless body was later pulled from the canal.

In a separate case involving the death of another Iraqi teenager, four British soldiers were acquitted of manslaughter.[17][18]

August 2003

Hanan Saleh Matrud, an eight-year-old Iraqi girl, was killed on August 21, 2003, by a soldier from the King's Regiment when a Warrior armoured vehicle stopped near an alley leading to her home. Three or four soldiers exited the vehicle, attracting a group of children, including Hanan. Accounts of what happened next differ. The soldiers claimed they came under attack from a mob throwing stones, prompting a "warning shot" to be fired.

However, local witnesses alleged that the crowd consisted only of children, who had been "coaxed into the open by the soldiers' offers of chocolate." Hanan was shot in the lower torso and rushed by the soldiers to a Czech-run hospital, where she died the following day after an unsuccessful operation. According to the Ministry of Defence (MOD), "in the absence of impartial witness evidence or forensic evidence to suggest a soldier had acted outside the rules of engagement, no crime was established." In May 2004, following an intervention by Amnesty International, Hanan's family submitted a formal claim for proper compensation, which was under assessment by the MOD as of that time.[19]

September 2003

Main article: Death of Baha Mousa On September 14, Baha Mousa, a 26-year-old hotel receptionist, was arrested along with six other men and taken to a British military base. While in detention, Mousa and the other captives were hooded, severely beaten, and assaulted by several soldiers at the base. Two days later, Mousa was found dead. [citation needed] A post-mortem examination revealed that Mousa had sustained multiple injuries—at least 93—including fractured ribs and a broken nose, which were identified as contributing factors to his death.[20] Seven members of the Queen's Lancashire Regiment were tried on charges related to the ill-treatment of detainees, including war crimes under the International Criminal Court Act 2001. On September 19, 2006, Corporal Donald Payne pleaded guilty to a charge of inhumane treatment of persons, making him the first member of the British Armed Forces to plead guilty to a war crime.[21] He was subsequently sentenced to one year in prison and expelled from the army.

The BBC reported that the six other soldiers were cleared of any wrongdoing.[22] The Independent stated that the charges against them had been dropped, with the presiding judge, Justice Ronald McKinnon, noting: "None of those soldiers has been charged with any offence, simply because there is no evidence against them as a result of a more or less obvious closing of ranks."[23]

January 2004

On January 1, Ghanem Kadhem Kati, an unarmed young man, was shot twice in the back by a British soldier at the door of his home. Troops had arrived at the scene after hearing gunfire, which neighbors reported was coming from a wedding party. Six weeks later, investigators from the Royal Military Police exhumed the teenager's body. However, no compensation has been offered, and the inquiry's conclusion has yet to be announced.[24] Footage from the gun camera of a US Apache helicopter killing 3 suspected Iraqi insurgents near al-Taji.[25] Originally shown on ABC TV.

Video footage from the gun camera of a U.S. Apache helicopter in Iraq, showing the killing of suspected Iraqi insurgents, was aired on ABC TV.[26] The case sparked controversy due to the ambiguity of the video. In the footage, a cylindrical object is tossed on the ground in a field. The U.S. military identified the object as an RPG or mortar tube and subsequently fired upon the individuals. However, IndyMedia UK suggested that the objects might have been harmless tools or implements. The publication also alleged that the helicopter fired upon a man who appeared to be wounded, which they argued would contradict international laws.[27][28] Retired U.S. Army General Robert Gard stated on German television that, in his opinion, the killings were "inexcusable murders."[29]

April 2004

On April 14, Lieutenant Ilario Pantano of the United States Marine Corps killed two unarmed captives. Pantano claimed that the captives had advanced on him in a threatening manner. The officer presiding over his Article 32 hearing recommended a court-martial for "body desecration." However, all charges against Pantano were dropped due to a lack of credible evidence or testimony. He later separated from the Marine Corps with an honorable discharge.

In February 2006, a video showing a group of British soldiers apparently beating several Iraqi teenagers was posted on the internet and soon broadcast on major television networks worldwide. The video, filmed in April 2004, was taken from an upper storey of a building in the southern Iraqi town of Al-Amarah. It shows a crowd of Iraqis outside a coalition compound. After an altercation in which members of the crowd reportedly threw rocks and an improvised grenade at the soldiers, the soldiers rushed the crowd. They brought some Iraqi teenagers into the compound and proceeded to beat them.

The video also includes a voiceover, apparently by the cameraman, taunting the beaten teenagers. The person recording could be heard saying: Oh, yes! Oh Yes! Now you gonna get it. You little kids. You little motherfucking bitch!, you little motherfucking bitch.[30] The event was broadcast in mainstream media, leading the British government and military to condemn it. The incident raised particular concerns for British soldiers, who had previously enjoyed a more favorable position than American soldiers in the region. Following the incident, there were media reports expressing concerns about the safety of soldiers in the country.

While the tape received some criticism from Iraq, it was relatively muted, and media outlets found individuals willing to speak out. The Royal Military Police conducted an investigation, but the prosecuting authorities determined that there was insufficient evidence to justify court-martial proceedings.[31]

May 2004

In May 2004, a British soldier identified as M004 mistreated captured, unarmed prisoners of war during a "tactical questioning" at Camp Abu Naji. [citation needed] See: Mukaradeeb wedding party massacre On May 19, 2004, the village of Mukaradeeb was attacked by American helicopters, resulting in the deaths of 42 men, women, and children. The casualties included 11 women and 14 children, as confirmed by Hamdi Noor al-Alusi, the manager of the nearest hospital. Western journalists also viewed the bodies of the children before they were buried.[32]

November 2005

See: Haditha killings 2005 Marine Killings in Haditha. On November 19, 24 Iraqis were killed, at least 15 of whom, and allegedly all, were non-combatant civilians. All are believed to have been killed by a group of U.S. Marines. The ongoing investigation into the incident claimed to have found evidence that "supports accusations that U.S. Marines deliberately shot civilians, including unarmed women and children," according to an anonymous Pentagon official.[33]

March 2006

See: Mahmudiyah killings On March 12, an Iraqi girl was raped and murdered along with her family in the Mahmudiyah killings. The incident led to the prosecution of the offenders and sparked a number of reprisal attacks against U.S. troops by insurgent forces. See: Ishaqi incident On March 15, 11 Iraqi civilians were allegedly bound and executed by U.S. troops in what is known as the "Ishaqi incident." A U.S. investigation concluded that military personnel had acted appropriately and followed the proper rules of engagement, responding to hostile fire and gradually escalating force until the threat was eliminated. The Iraqi government rejected the American conclusions. In September 2011, the Iraqi government reopened their investigation after WikiLeaks published a leaked diplomatic cable highlighting concerns raised by U.N. inspector Philip Alston, the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary, or Arbitrary Executions.[34]

April 2006

See: Hamdania incident On April 26, U.S. Marines shot and killed an unarmed Iraqi man. An investigation by the Naval Criminal Investigative Service led to charges of murder, kidnapping, and conspiracy related to the cover-up of the incident. The defendants include seven Marines and a Navy Corpsman. As of February 2007, five of the defendants had pleaded guilty to lesser charges of kidnapping and conspiracy and agreed to testify against the remaining defendants, who face murder charges. Additional Marines from the same battalion faced lesser charges of assault related to the use of physical force during interrogations of suspected insurgents.

May 2006

Main article: Operation Iron Triangle § Iron Triangle Murders On May 9, U.S. troops from the 101st Airborne Division executed three male Iraqi detainees at the Muthana Chemical Complex. An investigation and lengthy court proceedings followed. Spc. William Hunsaker and Pfc. Corey Clagett both pleaded guilty to murder and were each sentenced to 18 years for premeditated murder. Spc. Juston Graber pleaded guilty to aggravated assault for shooting one of the wounded detainees and was sentenced to nine months.

A fourth soldier, Staff Sgt. Ray Girouard of Sweetwater, Tennessee, was convicted of obstruction of justice, conspiracy to obstruct justice, and violation of a general order.[35][36]

Human rights in northern Iraq

In Iraqi Kurdistan, according to a 1995 Amnesty International report, the "prime responsibility for human rights abuses lies with the two parties holding the reins of power in Iraqi Kurdistan – the KDP and PUK," due to their political and military dominance. Amnesty reported that Francis Yusuf Shabo, an Assyrian Christian politician responsible for addressing complaints by Assyrian Christians about disputed villages, was shot dead on May 31, 1993, in Duhok, and no one had been brought to justice. Similarly, Lazar Mikho Hanna (known as Abu Nasir), another Assyrian Christian politician, was shot dead on June 14, 1993, in Duhok.

Amnesty criticized the impunity granted to Kurdish political parties' armed and special forces, noting that assailants were not held accountable. The report highlighted the "active undermining of the judiciary and the lack of respect for its independence by the political parties." It also documented incidents where Kurdish forces "arrested people arbitrarily," tortured detainees, killed civilians, and failed to bring perpetrators to justice.[37] The UNHCR reported incidents of violence against political opponents and minorities in areas under Kurdish control.

Minority leaders have alleged that Kurdish political parties and forces have subjected them to violence, forced assimilation, discrimination, political marginalization, and arbitrary arrests and detention. The UNHCR noted that Kurdish parties and forces have been "considered responsible for arbitrary arrests, incommunicado detention, and torture of political opponents and members of ethnic/religious minorities." The report also highlighted complaints from Christians about Kurdish attempts to assimilate them, as well as allegations of "the use of force, discrimination, and electoral fraud by Kurdish parties and militias." One notable incident occurred in October 2006, when KRG forces reportedly raided the building of a Christian media organization and detained its staff.

The UNHCR reported claims from Christian parties alleging "harassment and forced assimilation by Kurdish militias in Kirkuk and surrounding areas, with the aim of incorporating these areas into the Region of Kurdistan." Christians have accused Kurdish parties and their military forces of engaging in "acts of violence and discrimination, arbitrary arrests and detention on sectarian grounds, political marginalization (including through electoral manipulations), monopolization of government offices, and altering demographics to incorporate Kirkuk and other mixed areas into the Region of Kurdistan."

The Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) described this strategy as a form of "soft ethnic cleansing."[38] According to the UNHCR, Christians have repeatedly complained about ongoing Kurdification efforts. The U.S. State Department also reported that "Kurdish authorities abused and discriminated against minorities in the North, including Turkmen, Arabs, Christians, and Shabak." The UNHCR further noted that Kurdish parties "denied services to certain villages, arrested minorities without due process, detained them in undisclosed locations, and pressured minority schools to teach in the Kurdish language."[39][note 1] Additionally, Christians and Shabak people alleged that in the 2005 elections, "non-resident Kurds entered polling centers, and over 200 votes were cast illegally before the Multi-National Force intervened to stop the voting irregularities."[40] In 2005, a peaceful demonstration by Shabak people "turned violent after KDP gunmen shot at the crowd."[41][42] The UNHCR reported that Christians were at "risk of arbitrary arrest and incommunicado detention" by Kurdish forces.

The Washington Post highlighted extrajudicial detentions as early as 2005, describing a "concerted and widespread initiative" by Kurdish parties to assert authority in Kirkuk in an increasingly provocative manner. The report noted that arbitrary arrests and abductions by Kurdish militias had "greatly exacerbated tensions along purely ethnic lines." The UN Assistance Mission for Iraq's Human Rights Office (UNAMI HRO) stated in 2007 that religious minorities "face increasing threats, intimidation, and detentions, often in KRG facilities run by Kurdish intelligence and security forces."[43] The Washington Post estimated that there were 600 or more extrajudicial transfers, with detainees reporting "arbitrary arrests, incommunicado detentions, the use of torture, and unlawful confiscation of property."[44] Abuses by Kurdish forces ranged from "threats and intimidation to detention in undisclosed locations without due process."[45] The Kurdish parties’ plans to incorporate "disputed areas" like Kirkuk into Kurdistan were met with resistance from Christian, Arab, and Turkmen groups.

The UNHCR noted that Christians and Arabs in Mosul, Kirkuk, and surrounding areas, which are "under de facto control of the KRG," have become victims of threats, harassment, and arbitrary detention. The UNHCR also reported that Christian and Arab internally displaced people (IDPs) face discrimination and that those expressing opposition to the Kurdish parties, such as by participating in demonstrations, risk "arbitrary arrest and detention."

The KDP and PUK have been "repeatedly accused of nepotism, corruption, and lack of internal democracy," according to the UNHCR. Journalists have claimed that press freedom is restricted and that criticism of the ruling parties can result in physical harassment, the seizure of cameras and notebooks, and arrest.[46] For example, Kamal Sayid Qadir was sentenced to 30 years in prison after writing critically about Kurdish leader Masoud Barzani. The sentence was later reduced due to international pressure.[38][47] The UNHCR also reported arbitrary detentions of suspected political opponents by Kurdish authorities. Minorities have complained about "forcible assimilation into Kurdish society," increased discrimination against the non-Kurdish population, and efforts to dominate and "kurdify" traditionally mixed areas like Kirkuk. A 2006 poll conducted in Erbil, Sulaymaniyah, and Dahuk revealed that 79% of Kurds opposed allowing Arabs to enter Iraqi Kurdistan, and 63% opposed their settlement in the region.[38] Assyrian groups have stated that Kurdish authorities alter historical and geographical facts in school textbooks. For example, Assyrian Christian places are reportedly given new Kurdish names, and historical or Biblical figures are claimed to be Kurdish.[48][49] The American Mesopotamian Organization (AMO) demanded an official apology from Kurdistan President Massoud Barzani for the murder of Assyrians by Kurds in the past, alleging that thousands of Assyrian Christians were killed in the region over the last century. The AMO also criticized a message from Barzani on the occasion of Assyrian Martyrs Remembrance Day, which coincided with the 80th anniversary of the Semile massacre. The massacre, conducted by Kurdish general Bakr Sidqi, was referenced in Barzani's message, which controversially portrayed the Assyrians killed in the Simmele massacre as martyrs in the "Kurdistan liberation movement."[50][51] Assyrians in the Iraqi Kurdistan region face significant discrimination in various fields of work. Christian Assyrians are often limited to jobs as salespeople in liquor shops or as beauticians in salons, making them targets for Muslim extremists. In 2011, many Assyrian shops were burned. Additionally, Assyrians are reportedly excluded from professions such as police officers, soldiers, journalists for major media outlets, judges, and senior positions within educational institutions.

Local Assyrian history in the KRG-controlled area is often rebranded as Kurdish history. City names have been changed to Kurdish, and Assyrian heritage sites are reportedly neglected or destroyed. Furthermore, Assyrian history is not acknowledged in school textbooks, museums, or during memorial days.[52] There are also claims that Kurdish criminal organizations force Assyrian girls, particularly vulnerable refugees from southern Iraq, into prostitution. Those who refuse reportedly face death threats. These organizations are said to have ties to political leaders, enabling them to quickly issue passports and send these girls to European Union countries to work in the sex trade.[52] Assyrians allege that Kurds are actively working to "Kurdify" the local Christian population in northern Iraq. Reports indicate that Christians are sometimes forced to identify as Kurds to access essential services like education or healthcare. Similarly, Yazidis and Shabaks are not recognized as distinct ethnicities, and Assyrians from northern Iraq are increasingly pressured to identify as "Kurdistani" or "Kurdish Christians."

The KRG has also been accused of discriminatory practices against non-Kurdish minorities. Many Assyrians and Yazidis in the Nineveh Plains claim that the KRG has confiscated their property without compensation and has begun constructing settlements on their land. There have also been allegations of killings of Assyrians by agents of Kurdish political parties. Reports suggest that the KRG uses tactics such as intimidation, threats, restricted access to services, arbitrary arrests, and extrajudicial detentions to pressure political opponents and ordinary members of minority communities into supporting the KRG’s efforts to expand into disputed territories.[note 2] In 2014, Assyrians accused the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) of systematically disarming and abandoning Assyrian and other minority communities in anticipation of an ISIS assault. The KRG reportedly distributed notices to Assyrians in northern Iraq, demanding their complete disarmament and assuring them that the Kurdish Peshmerga would protect them against ISIS. However, when ISIS launched its attacks, the Peshmerga abruptly retreated.

A similar situation occurred in the Sinjar region and Shingal, where Kurdish Peshmerga forces retreated as ISIS advanced in 2014.[53][54] Peshmerga General Holgard Hekmat, a spokesman for the Peshmerga Ministry, admitted in an interview with SpiegelOnline: “Our soldiers just ran away. It’s a shame and apparently a reason why they invent such allegations.”[55][56] As a result of these events, approximately 150,000 Assyrian Christians were violently displaced from their ancestral homes in the Nineveh Plains.[57] A KRG official was quoted in a Reuters article in 2014, stating, “ISIL gave us in two weeks what Maliki couldn’t give us in eight years.”[57] Some Assyrians activists claim they have suffered not only from Arabization but also from Kurdification in Iraqi Kurdistan. These activists allege that the number of Christians living in the region has declined due to the destruction of villages and the implementation of Kurdification policies.[58] Historically, Christians, including Assyrian Christians, made up a much larger proportion of the population in northern Iraq and Iraqi Kurdistan than they do today. Their numbers have significantly decreased due to massacres, displacement, and other factors.

Additionally, the region is home to crypto-Christians–individuals who outwardly identify as Kurdish Muslims but retain memories of their Armenian or Nestorian Christian heritage. Relations between the remaining Christian population and the Kurds have often been strained.[59] According to Assyrian expert Michael Youash, some Christians became refugees because Kurds seized their land, and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) failed to assist them in reclaiming it.[60] In 2007, Youash also reported "numerous instances of Kurdish authorities discriminating against minorities in the North," noting that authorities denied services to certain villages, arrested minorities without due process, and pressured minority schools to teach in Kurdish.[60] Additionally, reports indicate that Christians who lack political representation struggle to expand their schools and often face exclusion from anything beyond basic funding.[58] Assyrian groups criticized the Kurdish authorities' investigations into a series of bombings targeting Christians in 1998 and 1999.[61] Assyrians have also been victims of attacks by the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and have often been caught in intra-Kurdish conflicts. For instance, in 1997, six Assyrians were killed during a PKK attack in Dohuk.[61] A 1999 U.S.

government country report cited allegations by the Assyrian International News Agency about the murder and rape of Helena Aloun Sawa, an Assyrian housekeeper for a KDP politician. Assyrians alleged that this case fit a "well-established pattern" of Kurdish authorities' complicity in attacks against Assyrian Christians in northern Iraq.[61] In more recent times, some scholars have noted that in northern Iraq, particularly in the area of "ancient Assyria," Kurdish expansion has come at the expense of the Assyrian population. Due to both Arab and Kurdish intimidation policies, particularly by the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), the Aramaic-speaking Christian population has been significantly reduced. It has been claimed that Kurds have "raised impediments to the acquisition of international aid for development, attempted to prevent the establishment of Aramaic language schools, and blocked the creation of Christian Assyrian schools." These issues have also been criticized by the U.S. State Department.

Additionally, attacks on Christians have been perpetrated by both Arab and Kurdish Islamist groups, such as ISIS and the Kurdish Ansar ul-Islam.[62][63][note 3] Kurdish forces have also been accused of harassing Arab residents.[64][65] Assyrian Christian refugees have been blocked from returning to their villages across the Nineveh Plain by the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG), according to a report from The Investigative Project on Terrorism. Jeff Gardiner, director of Restore Nineveh Now, stated, "The Kurdish authorities did not protect the people of the Nineveh Plain. In a way, this was enabled by the Kurdish government. They really set them [Assyrians] up for this catastrophic outcome." Gardiner dismissed claims of a security risk, calling the KRG's actions a "land grab."

Robert Nicholson of The Philos Project remarked, "For months we've been receiving numerous reports from Assyrian Christians and Yazidis that Kurdish forces are using the fog of war to seize land that rightfully belongs to victims of genocide. Each week those reports are increasing. The Nineveh Plain has never been a Kurdish territory. It belongs to the Christians (Assyrians) and Yazidis who have been living there for thousands of years." Members of the Nineveh Protection Units, an Assyrian militia, have faced obstruction by the KRG, with their movements impeded by Kurdish forces.[66] In a letter to Kurdistani President Masoud Barzani, John McCain expressed concern about "reports of land confiscation and statements you have made regarding Kurdish territorial claims to the Nineveh Plains region."

According to Gardner, "This is nothing new. Assyrian Christians complained about the illegal settlement of Kurdistani families on Assyrian land in the early 1990s. The ultimate strategy aims to unify Iraq's Kurds with those in Syria and Turkey in a broader Kurdish state."[67][68][69] In December 2011, hundreds of Kurds in Zakho burned and destroyed Christian Assyrian businesses and hotels after Friday prayers. Human rights groups suggested that the riots were planned by Kurdish authorities, noting that security representatives had made inquiries about liquor stores three days before the riots and that security forces did not intervene to stop the violence. Assyrians also face discrimination in the labor market and are burdened with administrative tasks, such as the annual requirement for Internally Displaced Persons to obtain a residence permit.

Assyrian students are treated and graded differently from Kurdish students. Additionally, Assyrians "suffer abuses and discrimination as a result of the KRG's aspirations to extend its control and its plans to reshape the demographics of Mosul and the Nineveh Plains." An official police force composed of Assyrians "has not been established due to massive resistance from Kurdish groups."[70] Government complicity in "religiously motivated discrimination has been reported in the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG)." According to the State Department, Christians "living in areas north of Mosul asserted that the KRG confiscated their property without compensation," and Assyrian Christians also alleged that the Kurdish Democratic Party-dominated judiciary routinely discriminates against non-Muslims. Chaldo-Assyrian Christians have stated that KRG officials "deny Christians key social benefits, including employment and housing," and that "foreign reconstruction assistance for Assyrian communities is being controlled by the KRG." KRG officials have used "public works projects to divert water and other vital resources from Assyrian to Kurdish communities." These deprivations led to a mass exodus, followed by "the seizure and conversion of abandoned Assyrian property by the local Kurdish population." Turkmen groups report "similar abuses by Kurdish officials, suggesting a pattern of pervasive discrimination, harassment, and marginalization."

Violence against Iraq's Christian community "remains a significant concern, particularly in Baghdad and the northern Kurdish regions," with a pattern of "official discrimination, harassment, and marginalization by KRG officials exacerbating these conditions."[71][72][73] Kurdish groups have been accused of attempting to annex territories belonging to Assyrians, "claiming that these areas are historically Kurdish." Since 2003, "Kurdish peshmerga, security forces, and political parties have moved into these territories, establishing de facto control over many of the disputed areas." Assyrians, Shabak, and Turkomen groups have accused Kurdish forces "of engaging in systematic abuses and discrimination against them to further Kurdish territorial claims." These accusations include "reports of Kurdish officials interfering with minorities' voting rights, encroaching on, seizing, and refusing to return minority land, conditioning the provision of services and assistance to minority communities on support for Kurdish expansion, forcing minorities to identify themselves as either Arabs or Kurds, and impeding the formation of local minority police forces."[74]

Freedom of speech and political freedom

Kurdish officials in Iraq have accused the ruling Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), led by Masoud Barzani, of "all kinds of intimidation," corruption, and ballot stuffing.[75][65] During the 2005 elections, "Kurdish authorities, tasked with delivering ballot boxes to Assyrian districts in Iraqi Kurdistan, failed to do so, while Assyrian election workers were fired upon and killed." As a consequence, the Assyrian Democratic Movement was marginalized.[76]

The current state of human rights

Numerous human rights organizations and Shiite officials have raised significant criticisms, alleging that Sunni groups have systematically kidnapped, tortured, and killed Shiites or those they consider enemies. Amnesty International has also extensively criticized the Iraqi government for its handling of the Walid Yunis Ahmad case, in which an ethnically Turkmen journalist from Iraqi Kurdistan was held for ten years without charge or trial.[77] According to the Human Rights Watch annual report, the human rights situation in Iraq remains deplorable. Since 2015, the country has been embroiled in a bloody armed conflict involving ISIS and a coalition of Kurdish forces, central Iraqi government forces, pro-government militias, and a United States-led international air campaign. The United Nations reported that 3.2 million Iraqis were displaced due to the conflict. Furthermore, the international organization stated that the warring parties employed various methods, including extrajudicial executions, suicide attacks, and airstrikes, which resulted in the deaths and injuries of over 20,000 civilians.[78] An Amnesty International report concluded that the Peshmerga forces of the semi-autonomous Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) were preventing residents of Arab villages and Arab residents of mixed Arab-Kurdish towns from returning to their homes. In some cases, the Peshmerga forces had destroyed or allowed the destruction of homes and property, seemingly to prevent residents from returning in the future. Amnesty reported that Arab houses were often looted, intentionally burned, bulldozed, or blown up after fighting had ended, and the Peshmerga had taken control of these areas. These actions were not isolated incidents but part of a broader pattern.

The report emphasized that the forced displacement of Arab residents and the extensive, unlawful destruction of civilian homes and property violated international humanitarian law and should be investigated as war crimes. For example, the village of Tabaj Hamid was completely razed, and in Jumeili, 95% of all walls and structures were destroyed. Amnesty International researchers reported being apprehended by Peshmerga forces, who escorted them out of the area and prevented them from taking photographs.[79][80][81][82] Amnesty stated that the deliberate demolition of civilian homes is unlawful under international humanitarian law and considered these acts of forced displacement to constitute war crimes.[83] The organization also urged KRG authorities to conduct prompt and independent investigations into all deaths that occurred during protests against the KDP, such as those in October 2015, and to disclose the findings.[84] Amnesty International criticized the Peshmerga forces of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and Kurdish militias in northern Iraq for bulldozing, blowing up, and burning thousands of homes in what appears to be an effort to uproot Arab communities. The report, Banished and Dispossessed: Forced Displacement and Deliberate Destruction in Northern Iraq, is based on field investigations in Iraq. It stated, “Tens of thousands of Arab civilians who were forced to flee their homes because of fighting are now struggling to survive in makeshift camps in desperate conditions. Many have lost their livelihoods and all their possessions, and with their homes destroyed, they have nothing to return to. By barring the displaced from returning to their villages and destroying their homes, KRG forces are further exacerbating their suffering.” The report provided evidence of forced displacement and large-scale destruction of homes in villages and towns by Peshmerga forces.[85][86][87][88][89] Human Rights Watch also reported that Kurds denied Arabs the right to return to their homes while allowing Kurds free movement, even permitting Kurds to move into homes that belonged to Arabs.[90] In a 2016 report titled ‘Where Are We Supposed to Go?’: Destruction and Forced Displacement in Kirkuk, Amnesty International documented cases of Kurdish authorities demolishing and bulldozing homes and forcibly displacing hundreds of Arab residents.[91] In 2005, during a demonstration by the Democratic Shabak Coalition, the KDP opened fire on protestors, killing two Assyrians and wounding several Assyrians and Shabak participants.[92] Additionally, Assyrian groups have accused Kurdish authorities of election rigging in northern Iraq and of preventing Assyrian representation in politics.[93] The Shabak people have also suffered from discrimination. Hunain al-Qaddo, a Shabak politician, told Human Rights Watch that "the Peshmerga have no genuine interest in protecting his community and that Kurdish security forces are more interested in controlling Shabaks and their leaders than protecting them." He further stated that Shabaks are "suffering at the hands of the Peshmerga and that the Kurdish government refuses to let the Iraqi armed forces protect them or allow them to establish their own Shabak police force to safeguard their community."

Kurdish forces have been implicated in some attacks against Shabaks. In 2008, Mullah Khadim Abbas, the leader of the Shabak Democratic Gathering—a group opposing the incorporation of Shabak villages into the KRG—was killed only 150 meters from a Peshmerga outpost. Before his assassination, Abbas had angered Kurdish authorities by criticizing Shabaks who supported Kurdish agendas and denouncing Kurdish policies that, in his view, undermined the identity of the Shabak community.

In 2009, Shabak lawmaker al-Qaddo survived an assassination attempt in the Nineveh Plains. He told Human Rights Watch that the attackers wore Kurdish security uniforms. Al-Qaddo alleged that the Kurdish government aimed to impose its will on the Shabak and acquire their lands by silencing him. Shabak leaders have frequently complained about the lack of accountability for killings. In some incidents, the KDP was accused of failing to investigate the deaths of non-Kurdish civilians at the hands of the Peshmerga. Human Rights Watch noted that "the root of the problem is the near-universal perception among Kurdish leaders that minority groups are, in fact, Kurds." The report further stated that Kurdish authorities have sometimes dealt harshly with Yazidi and Shabak individuals who resisted attempts to impose a Kurdish identity on them.[94]

Sectarian warfare in Iraq

Iraq experienced a state of sectarian civil war from 2006 to 2008. During this period, small groups and militias carried out bombings in civilian areas and assassinations targeting officials at various levels, as well as Shiites and smaller religious minorities. Secular-oriented individuals, officials of the new government, aides to the United States (such as translators), and individuals and families from the country's various religious groups faced violence and death threats.

Refugee response to threats to life

See also Refugees of Iraq. As a result of attempted murders and death threats, approximately 2 million Iraqis fled the country, primarily seeking refuge in Syria, Jordan, and Egypt.[95]

Propaganda

On February 17, 2006, then U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld discussed the emergence of new realities in the media age:[96] "In Iraq, for example, the U.S. military command, working closely with the Iraqi government and the U.S. embassy, has sought nontraditional means to provide accurate information to the Iraqi people in the face of aggressive campaign of disinformation. Yet this has been portrayed as inappropriate; for example, the allegations of someone in the military hiring a contractor, and the contractor allegedly paying someone to print a story—a true story—but paying to print a story."

On March 3, 2006, Army General George Casey stated, "The U.S. military plans to continue paying Iraqi newspapers to publish articles favorable to the United States after an inquiry found no fault with the controversial practice." Casey explained that an internal review had concluded the U.S. military was not violating U.S. law or Pentagon guidelines with its information operations campaign. As part of this campaign, U.S. troops and a private contractor wrote pro-American articles and paid to have them published in Iraqi media without attribution.[97] The legal status of freedom of speech and the press in Iraq remains unclear. While both freedoms are guaranteed in the Iraqi Constitution, they include exemptions for Islamic morality and national security. Additionally, the 1969 Iraqi Criminal Code contains vague prohibitions against using the press or any electronic means of communication for "indecent" purposes.

Women's rights

Main article: Women in Iraq Prevalence of female genital mutilation in Iraq for women aged 15–49 using UNICEF "Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting, 2013.[98] There is a more recent 2016 survey here:.[99] Green = Less than 3%, Blue = 15-25%, Red = Above 50%. The highest prevalence rates of FGM are in Kirkuk (20%), Sulaymaniyah (54%) and Erbil (58%). Women in Iraq at the beginning of the 21st century face a status that is influenced by many factors, including wars (most recently the Iraq War), sectarian religious conflict, debates concerning Islamic law and Iraq's Constitution, cultural traditions, and modern secularism. Hundreds of thousands of Iraqi women have been widowed as a result of a series of wars and internal conflicts. Women's rights organizations continue to struggle against harassment and intimidation as they work to promote improvements to women's status in law, education, the workplace, and many other spheres of Iraqi life. According to a 2008 report in the Washington Post, the Kurdistan region of Iraq is one of the few places in the world where female genital mutilation has been rampant.[100] In 2008, the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) stated that honor killings are a serious concern in Iraq, particularly in Iraqi Kurdistan.[101] Honor killings are common in the region, and women also face forced and underage marriage, domestic violence, and polygamy issues. Since the early 1990s, several thousand Iraqi Kurdish women have died from self-immolation.[102]

Other human rights

The United States, through the CPA, abolished the death penalty (which has since been reinstated) and ordered that the Criminal Code of 1969 (as amended in 1985) and the Civil Code of 1974 would be the operating legal system in Iraq. However, there has been some debate regarding the extent to which the CPA rules have been applied. For example, the Iraqi Criminal Code of 1969 (as amended in 1985) does not prohibit the formation of trade unions, and the Iraqi Constitution promises that such organizations will be recognized (a right under Article 23 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights). However, for some reason, the Iraqi courts and special tribunals seem to be operating under a slightly revised version of the 1988 legal code, which means that the 1987 ban on unions might still be in place.

Likewise, while the Iraqi Criminal Code of 1969 or the apparent 1988 edition does not expressly prohibit homosexual relations between consenting adults in private (a right under a United Nations Human Rights Commission ruling in 1994), scattered reports suggest that homosexuality is still being treated as a crime, possibly a capital crime under a 2001 amendment that technically should not exist. For more information on this topic, see Gay rights in Iraq.

Post COVID-19 rights

Further information: COVID-19 pandemic in Iraq During COVID-19, the Iraqi government implemented stricter curfews and limited shopping hours instead of full lockdowns, aiming to keep the economy afloat. However, human welfare significantly worsened due to droughts in the area. The modern government did not provide adequate assistance to the majority of the population during the crisis. All but two refugee camps were closed, and internally displaced people were targeted by armed forces. Many of these displaced families had been fleeing the Syrian civil war. In December and November 2021, heavy rainfall caused flash floods, leading to many families becoming homeless or displaced, both internally and externally.

Notes

See also